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Abstract  
 
The security institutions and policies in Kosovo have been controlled and shaped by the international 
actors since the end of the Kosovo war. Due to the large amount of actors with differing objectives, as 
well as the problematic relationship with Serbia and the unresolved status of Kosovo, the security 
sector has suffered from the lack of systematic institutional development. 
 
This thesis looks into the transformation of Kosovo‘s security sector in the post-conflict period from 
1999 through early 2015. The central focus of the study is on how the international community first 
took over the ownership and management of the security institutions and how it was later gradually 
transferred to the local community. The objective here is to point out the potential pitfalls and 
structural inefficiencies of the policies that have steered the security sector‘s development process. 
 
The analytical part of this thesis consists of three sections, which all mark a certain period of time. 
During the first phase (1999-2005) the first Kosovo security institutions, including the Kosovo Police, 
were established. The demilitarization efforts of the KLA, and their implications, will be dealt with as 
well. The second phase (2005-2008) looks into the initial handover of the responsibilities from the 
international community to the Kosovo Government and the third phase (2008-2013) concentrates 
on the new security sector architecture introduced following Kosovo‘s declaration of independence. 
 
The observations made suggest that the international community has failed in providing sufficient 
support for the local community to develop transferable skills in security management. On one hand 
the international community has managed to stabilize the situation quickly by taking over all 
institutions, but on the other, this has crippled the Kosovars as they are not prepared to run them on 
their own. The recent Security Sector Review paves the way for a presentable transformation, but it is 
clear that the Kosovars are no longer willing to let the international community dictate how the 
security sector is structured, managed and resourced.  
 
Neutral point of view or Serbian spelling will be used for all proper nouns. 
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Acronyms 
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KFOR Kosovo Force 
KSF Kosovo Security Force 
KIPRED Kosovar Institute for Policy 
Research and Development 
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army 
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps 
KPS Kosovo Police Service 
KPSS Kosovo Police Service School 
KSIP Kosovo Standards 
Implementation Plan 
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SSSR Strategic Security Sector Review 
UNDP United Nations Development 
Programme 
UNMIK United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo 
UNMIK-P UNMIK Police 
JIC Joint Implementation Commission 
JIC Joint Implementation Commission 
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1 Introduction 
 
This thesis intends to identify and evaluate the role of the international and local actors in 
constructing a functional security sector in post-conflict Kosovo. The main focus will be on the 
institutions responsible for the national security and defense, including international missions and 
presence. The demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army will be considered as a significant 
element in this process.  
 
The analytical part of this thesis consists of three sections, which all mark a certain period of time. 
The first section deals with the first six years since the end of the conflict, from 1999 until 2005. The 
demilitarization efforts and their implications will be looked into in more detail. The second part 
concentrates on the period from 2005 until 2008 when the first institutions were established. The last 
part then evaluates the most current developments, in particular the Security Sector Review published 
in March 2014, starting from 2008 when the Ahtisaari plan was implemented. 
 
Following the NATO bombings Kosovo‘s economy and political institutions were in a state of total 
collapse. The Military Technical Agreement between NATO‘s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia was signed on the 9th 
of June 1999, finally concluding the Kosovo war. On the 10th of June, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 1244 which provided the legal framework for establishing the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR.  
 
Kosovo has been under this international administration from 1999 until 2008, with some of its 
functions still running today, and some take over by European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). 
UNMIK consisted of a comprehensive set of international institutions and organizations designed to 
provide orchestrated efforts in post-war reconstruction and institution-building. KFOR‘s membership 
of almost 50,000 men and women was set up to ensure safety in the territory.
1
 One of its first tasks 
was to oversee the process of demilitarization and transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. 
 
NATO‘s intervention was followed by a widespread ‗reverse ethnic cleansing‘ targeting the Serb 
population. This was described by the then chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, Carla Del Pointe, as being ‗as serious as what happened there before 
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NATO‘s intervention.‘2 Some of the major concerns for the KFOR and the international community 
were how to end the violence, how the military could protect the now endangered minorities and 
Albanian moderates and could the KLA be marginalized without generating a backlash that could 
threaten the internal stability of the region.
3
  
 
In Kosovo NATO was faced with a completely new situation and a number of policy issues. The 
organization was established during the Cold War to defend Western Europe and the North Atlantic, 
but it performed its first actual act of war by aggressively intervening in a conflict outside its territory 
and, moreover, without a UN mandate. Although NATO argued that it was forced to act in order to 
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, it violated an important international political taboo; the 
prohibition of intervention. 
 
NATO's problem was ultimately the implementation of the Kosovo peace plan, which was outlined in 
the UNSC document S/1999/649.
4
 Although Kosovo‘s administration was taken over by the UN, 
NATO as the initiator of the intervention had to take military responsibility in Kosovo and the 
Balkans in general. NATO also had to prove that the scale of the crimes justified the airstrikes against 
Serbian forces and infrastructure. 
 
It was clear from the beginning that NATO‘s quest for peace would be long and difficult. Since 
NATO now exercised authority over the territory that KLA, who perceived themselves as the victors 
of war, considered theirs, NATO was soon labeled by the local population as one of the obstacles 
standing in the way of Kosovo‘s independence. It was equally difficult was to predict how Russia, 
China and some other countries would react to NATO's way of interpreting the international law 
however they liked. 
 
The development of security sector Kosovo differs slightly from the other Western Balkans countries, 
as most of the institutions were built from scratch with the support of the international community. 
There was no institutional correlation between former Yugoslav security structures and post-conflict 
security institutions in Kosovo.
5
 Some of the key issues faced by the international community in this 
process are the following;  
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1) The legacy of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Many of the former KLA combatants are now 
influential figures in politics and despite the reintegration efforts, most the former soldiers have not 
returned to civilian life. Many have served in the ever-changing emergency response forces, now 
Kosovo Security Force, and the Kosovo Police.  
 
2) Inter-ethnic relations between the Albanian and minority communities. The international 
community has been particularly vehement in demanding the Kosovo government to advance the 
rights and integration of both the Serbian and the RAE -communities in the society. However, the 
efforts to recruit Serbs in the Kosovo Police have not been successful as minority representation is not 
sufficient despite the quotas enforced.  
 
3) Socio-economic challenges. The Kosovar society is currently facing multiple issues, including 
unemployment, corruption and heavy reliance on remittances, which have different levels of security 
implications.  
 
The security sector development itself can be divided roughly into three phases; during the first phase 
(1999-2005) the first Kosovo security institutions, including the Kosovo Police, were established. The 
second phase (2005-2008) looks into the initial handover of the responsibilities from the international 
community to the Kosovo Government and the third phase (2008-2013) concentrates on the new 
completed security sector architecture introduced following Kosovo‘s declaration of independence.6 
The UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Rambouillet Agreement were used as a legal basis for the 
gradual transformation of the security sector, and the political climate was perceived stable enough to 
justify an increase in the local ownership over time.
7
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2 Methodology, theory and concepts 
 
I have chosen to approach my topic as a case study.  This thesis examines the post-conflict security 
sector reconstruction efforts and challenges, as well as destabilizing factors and security threats in 
Kosovo. The causes of conflict and especially the factors that might contribute to the re-escalation of 
conflict will be also dealt with. The past conflict will be analyzed to some extent as it is expected that 
similar causes for the initial conflict and the potential escalation of violence may be found.  
 
In order to more systematically evaluate the international actors‘ involvement in the reconstruction 
process and rebuilding of the security sector, different missions and programs will be analyzed 
according to four criteria defined by David Law as the following; 
 
1. Legitimacy and credibility. Were the internationals seen as having a legitimate right to enter the 
country, use force and pursue their agenda for change in the security sector? Were they seen to be 
politically and materially capable of carrying out their mission? 
 
2.  Strategy. Did they have a strategic plan to guide their efforts? 
 
3. Leadership and organization. Did they have the necessary leadership structures and organizational 
approaches to support the implementation of their strategy?  
 
4. Resources. Were they prepared to invest sufficient manpower and money into their programs?
8
 
 
The data 
 
Typical qualitative case study data sources consist of different interviews, media sources, statistics, 
observation and participant observation, as well as various documents, such as brochures, minutes of 
meetings, notes, diaries and so on. I have utilized many of the abovementioned types of data as the 
primary material for this thesis, with the most important documents being different legal documents, 
government publications and binding agreements. Due to a large amount of existing research 
literature, there is also a significant amount of references to secondary data as well.  
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In addition to qualitative data, I have chosen to analyze some quantitative material such as different 
statistics, figures on government spending and external funding. I am also using a few surveys carried 
out previously and then analyze the results with methods suitable for this thesis and its purpose. This 
large set of tools case studies provide helps me connect different types of material and methods of 
analysis and discover new unprecedented phenomena and information. 
 
The case and the question 
 
The cases are studied in a chronological order, with certain periods of time grouped together. Each 
case deals with a certain change in the security sector architecture that has produced a reform of a 
consisting institution or the establishment of a new one. The main research question - what are the 
major challenges in transferring responsibility from the international community to the local actors? – 
focuses on the overall developments in the security sector, while the subsidiary question - how 
successful was the demilitarization of the KLA in guaranteeing that the local security sector institutions 
are not controlled by the former combatants? – considers the influence and demands of particular 
local actors in the security sector. 
 
When studying several cases special attention should be given to the balance and diversity of the 
chosen cases. Case studies don‘t follow the logic of statistical modeling, which is based on the qualities 
of the cases (e.g. age, location, size). Different factors influence the case selection, such can the case 
even be examined, is it possible to get access to the data, are the potential interviewees willing to 
answer the questions, how to gather background material, can you publish inflammable results and so 
on.
9
  
 
The available resources and the access to the case must often also be taken into consideration. The 
researcher might want to specify the cases before beginning to gather the data, during it, or after the 
first round of analysis. Cases can thus be specified during the research process. This can be done 
either by drawing on theory and previous research or by observing the subject-specific, unique and 
interesting special characteristics that might not have been studied previously.  
 
Many peace researchers need to take ethical considerations into account when designing their study. 
During my internship in Kosovo I was able to talk to several locals who criticized foreign researchers 
and development cooperation project workers for simply ‗using‘ them for gathering material for their 
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projects while the research itself gave very little to the actual people who participated in it. Kathrine 
Höglund also refers to this phenomenon known as ‗research fatigue‘.10 I‘m hoping to avoid this by 
mainly utilizing material where the individual participants have already given their consent for 
publishing. Given my subject, however, most of them have been interviewed anonymous and only 
some attributes have been recorded (i.e. age, status, ethnicity). 
 
Peace research and peace-building in the context of the study 
 
Early peace research mainly concerned itself with the prevention of another world war, whereas 
modern peace research tends to focus on the dynamics civil war. More attention is now also given to 
the forms of indirect violence or structural violence, as it often occurs in situations of repression, 
occupation, colonialism and deterrence.
11
 Höglund and Öberg note that peace research has especially 
come to deal with organized violence in societal conflicts.
12
  
 
Although the Kosovo war was not categorically a civil war, nor would a conflict with Serbia be one 
now, you could also say it is a matter of perception. Someone who holds that Kosovo is a part of 
Serbia might regard Kosovo as a secessionist region initiating civil war. For that reason I will utilize 
theories and concepts associated mainly with civil war research.  According to Höglund, the causes of 
war research share a fairly similar approach to peace research: ―violence is the central issue; stringent 
hypotheses are developed and empirically tested, with the hope that this increased understanding will 
result in useful proposals on how to prevent wars from erupting.‖13   
 
This study also has a strong conflict transformation perspective. In order to achieve peace, we should 
not look at how to go back to how things were before the conflict, but transform the conditions so that 
the likelihood of renewed conflict is minimal. According to Collier, there is a 44 percent risk of 
recurrence of conflict in countries that host large political or ethnic groups and have recently come of 
out of a civil war.
14
 Building on Collier‘s theory, my plan is to identify which factors can shield Kosovo 
against a renewed conflict.  
 
According to Schnabel and Ehrhart, external militaries help facilitate the political, economic, and 
social transformation of the society. The troops‘ active role in reconstruction and the sheer presence 
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of military forces might discourage the return to violence. It is equally important for the local 
militaries to continue to work on security related tasks on the ground once external forces return 
home. Inadequate security sector reform may contribute to repeated cycle of violence, corruption, 
and insecurity. Therefore effective peace-building requires a thorough reform of the society‘s security 
sector – a process that requires the formulating or re-orienting the policies, structures, and capacities 
of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, as well as active involvement of military, 
economic, and political actors.
15
 
 
A security sector includes ‗‗all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of, 
force or threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are 
responsible for their management and oversight‘‘. This consists of military and paramilitary forces; 
intelligence services; police forces, border guards, and custom services; judicial and penal systems and 
respective civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight.
16
 
 
Should the government of Kosovo decide to make a large military investment, they might end up 
entering the arms race which is a typical example of a vicious cycle. Further investment in the military 
could send the wrong signal to neighboring countries and international actors. As a country acquires 
arms, supposedly to increase its own security, it may be seen as a threat by its adversaries, who then 
see it necessary to increase their arms, producing the so-called ‗security dilemma‘‖.17 This may lead to 
a vicious cycle of arms race between the two countries, which can be broken with a purely defensive 
military posture.
18
 Armament decisions, however, do not always necessarily follow military logic; partly 
it also has to do with the role of the state.
19
   
 
Security sector review 
 
A security sector review (SSR) can be conducted in peaceful societies, but post-conflict environments 
a pose their own challenges. David Law, for example, differentiates between situations where the 
security sector has to be reconstructed and those where it has to be built from scratch, such as in 
Kosovo. Whereas in peaceful environments the focus is on institutional reform, in post-conflict 
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settings notably if violence is still high, the primary concern is security and actual reform can only be 
conducted in more peaceful areas.
20
 
 
The focus on security, and the lead role that is given to the military, often results in the military 
reform taking undesirable precedence over police, judicial, penal, legislative and institutional reform 
in the long run. An overly military approach in providing law and order in detriment to communal 
policing tends to alienate the population and delegitimize the emerging security forces. Also, 
efficiency of the security forces has often been favored over accountability.
21
 
 
The OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System and Governance Reform define the broader 
security system, ‗‗which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working 
together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic 
norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security 
framework‘‘22 as consisting of the following key elements:  
 
―Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence 
and security services (both military and civilian); coastguards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security 
units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias).  
 
Security management and oversight bodies: the executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and 
legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs; customary and traditional 
authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); 
and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).  
 
Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and 
prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice 
systems. Non-statutory security forces with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerilla armies; 
private bodyguard units; private security companies; and political party militias‖.23 
 
In post-conflict situations cooperation between internal and external actors must be mutually 
reinforcing. Ideally, there should be an integrated approach to development, the strengthening of 
structures that allow for the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the prevention of violent conflict. 
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Security sector reform belongs in a larger multidimensional, political, economic, and societal 
framework of post-conflict peace-building.
24
  
 
A society‘s security sector reform include the ―strengthening of peacetime capacity of military forces, 
establishing clear mechanisms for accountability for the shift from being a threat to society to being a 
provider of security, balancing resources spent on military compared to overall security sector 
spending; for reorientation of the military away from domestic politics, overcoming ethnic and other 
divisions within the military and adjustment of training and education.‖ As a rule, all actors must 
respect the ‗‗do no harm‘‘ principle; that is, avoid making things worse than they already are.25  
 
 
Figure 1. Security system reform and other related activities
26
 
 
 
 
 
As a whole, the security sector reform must be integrated and mainstreamed into political dialogue 
and cooperation. Security sector reform must be included in development schemes and programs, 
and in political post-conflict presence, including protectorates and quasi-protectorates. A successful 
security sector reform also requires the provision of conditional financial assistance or external 
assistance limited only to non-military use.  
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The challenge is to integrate all of these aspects in peace-building operations and ensure that SSR 
mechanisms do not require the presence of international troops. All of these tasks are crucial 
components of a peace-building mission, including short-term stabilization and long-term conflict 
prevention. They also account for the human security principles; the social, economic, and political 
dimensions of post-conflict peace-building and security sector reform.  
 
The security needs of individuals and communities in post-conflict peace missions requires the 
linkage of political, economic, legal, social, and security sector reform. In this process the external 
actors are tasked with two important issues; first, putting security sector reform on the right path 
during the period of external presence; and second, facilitating partner country-owned and led reform 
efforts by ensuring that local actors are efficiently trained and resourced to continue that work.
27
  
 
Local actors must also agree to collaborate with external security providers and deliver noticeable 
results. Failure to do some might result in external actors losing interest and political and financial 
backing. One of the obstacles in this process is that internal elites may not be interested in 
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, while external actors may not demonstrate long-term 
commitment, mainly due to financial reasons.
28
  
 
SSR and peace-building  
 
Since the end of the Cold War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the military environment in 
the Balkans has evolved due to the new security perceptions of international actors that entered the 
scene. The presence of international troops deem any imminent military threats or external attacks 
unlikely, and while some political disputes and rivalries persist, most countries have engaged in 
downsizing and reforming their armed forces.
29
 Croatia and Albania have become NATO members 
with Montenegro being asked to join alliance, while Macedonia‘s membership bid has not been 
confirmed due to objections from Greece.
30
  
 
The sources of external security threats to Kosovo consist of terrorist organizations, international 
organized crime groups and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Kosovo and other small 
countries in the region lack resources to tackle global threats and this necessitates their participation in 
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international operations, as well as multilateral security cooperation. Therefore there is a need for a 
multipurpose security force that is able to react to a diverse nature of threats including those related to 
territorial integrity as well as natural and emergency situations, and respond to international crisis and 
peace-building operations.
31
  
 
The roles of security forces and the process of security sector reform are key ingredients of the post-
conflict peace-building agenda. The process of conflict transformation and the rebuilding of political 
institutions, security, and economic structures require a secure environment. The military forces must 
be able to cope with diverse such tasks as the reinstallation of order, support for local security forces, 
disarmament of combatants, facilitation of security sector reform, protection of elections, demining, 
and securing the repatriation of refugees and protection of human rights.
32
 
 
In order to achieve this, the external military forces need to be integral parts of the overall 
transformation process of the post-conflict society concerned. Military forces in even the most 
advanced democracies are themselves in a process of change. The emergence of a postmodern 
military is characterized by challenges such as the traditional values of honor and fatherland are 
increasingly being replaced by universal values such as freedom, democracy, and justice. Also, 
although fighting capacities remain important, other non-military tasks are gaining relevance.
33
  
 
The military is an institution of the state, and as such primarily an instrument to assure external 
security for the state and its society. In the changing security environment international security threats 
are increasingly defined by intrastate, not interstate, conflicts and internal conflicts have the potential 
to destabilize entire regions.
34
  
 
A functional police force is a requirement for upholding community security and essentially for all 
economic and social development. The police can‘t be biased towards any parts of the population, 
and community-based policing can help overcome cultural barriers between officers and the different 
ethnic groups. All violations of human rights by police forces must be checked and eliminated, and 
there must be support for border guards and customs services to prevent corruption, criminalization, 
and illicit trade.
35
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There is a need for the review and management of the civilian security management in order to 
strengthen civilian expertise in defense, justice, and internal ministries; to establish independent audit 
offices; to establish civilian review boards for police forces and penal institutions and to create 
parliamentary committees to cover defense, policing, and internal affairs.  
 
Security forces must be made trustworthy in the public‘s eye; fundamental human and legal rights of 
citizens must be respected and public legitimacy strengthened. Security forces ought to focus on their 
central task, which is the provision of security, not involvement in the political process and 
governance.  
 
A well-informed and independent civil society sector (NGOs, professional associations, independent 
media, and research and advocacy institutions) can review the accountability and efficiency of the 
security sector. These actors can also ensure that security sector monitoring is maintained after 
external assistance and oversight has been withdrawn.
36
 
 
The security sector‘s activities must be made more transparent by developing and publishing regular 
official statements on security policy and to increasing transparency in budgeting, accounting, and 
auditing as well as ensuring reduced corruption and inefficient investments in security sector programs 
and activities.  
 
Encouraging the establishment and strengthening of sub-regional organizations is essential in order to 
encourage external commitment to funding, and strengthening their conflict prevention and 
mediation and resolution mechanisms. The wider involvement of civil society in regional dialogues 
along with other actors reaffirms the long-term commitments to regional civil society development 
and dialogue.
37
  
 
Demobilization and long-term reintegration of ex-combatants to civilian life must be prioritized. This 
includes demobilization and disarming, reintegration, job training and creation and long-term reform 
programs to ensure security for ex-combatants and their families. In connection with demilitarization, 
the proliferation of arms must be limited. It is important to collect arms and enhance border control 
and internal security mechanisms to avoid the spread of small-arms.  
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2.1 Security at a glance 
 
One of the most important concepts in this thesis is security. In international relations, the notion of 
security has been dated back to the 1940s
38
. Security in this specific context has a broad definition and 
will be dealt with in parallel with other concepts, such as development, justice and defence. Security, 
as opposed to defence, is characterized by a constructive approach. It is thus about more than just the 
preservation and restoration of order.  
 
Security, development and justice are broad normative concepts whose empirical referents are vague, 
and whose operational meanings are constantly changing. They are also often understood differently 
by different stakeholders, including citizens, representatives of civil society, national governments and 
donors.
39
  
 
These notions also carry a positive value charge: they refer to values and goals (e.g. freedom, fairness, 
personal safety) that can be utilized for practical purposes, for instance in political discourse.
40
  
Various institutions established to deliver them with defence forces, civil ‗crisis management‘ 
personnel, police and humanitarian actors produce ‗security‘; and the aid industry produces 
‗development‘.41  
 
Concepts such as security sector/system reform (SSR), justice reform and the rule of law are often 
attached to the justice and security engagements in peace-building and state-building in conflict 
affected and fragile states.
42
 Rule of law can be defined as an overarching principle of safety, security 
and justice, which contributes to a number of outcomes, including personal safety and security, 
justice, equality and peaceful conflict management.
43 
SSR unarguably carries similar connotations; 
however, the focus is more on the state and its institutions.  
 
SSR and rule of law missions tend not to be associated with the political aspects of the reform, and 
instead confine themselves to the technical aspects of reform such as amending laws and legal texts, or 
strengthening executive agencies charged with the provision of security.
44
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Additionally; ―an environment where the rule of law is respected and security bodies are under the 
control of civilian authorities will help people feel safe and secure and encourage them to claim their 
rights as citizens. Conversely, where there is no effective and accountable national security structure, 
violence can permeate society and injustice can prevail.‖45 
 
Traditionally security has been something that the threat of armed conflict, especially conflict between 
states, and protected by arms, undermines. With the end of the Cold War, both the notions of 
security and development were broadened. A competing perspective, ‗human security‘, first 
introduced in the Human Development Report 1994 by the United Nations‘ Development Program 
UNDP, states security should mean not only ‗freedom from fear‘ but also ‗freedom from want‘.46 
 
Human security considers the fact that security for most people means more everyday things such as 
security of employment, income, health, the natural environment, or security from crime. Despite 
this, the previously dominant mode of the thinking has retained its strength and most talk of security 
remains focused on military conflicts. The definition of security itself, however, has been increasingly 
broadened with the incorporation of selected items from the human security agenda.
47
  
 
2.2 Previous research 
 
There is an abundance of research on the Kosovo war, particularly on the legitimacy of the NATO 
intervention and the war crimes committed by the Serbian military and paramilitary forces. The post-
conflict period has not been analysed to a similar extent. This may be a reflection of the progress of 
peacekeeping and –building missions; typically once the military conflict is resolved there is little 
follow-up on the post-conflict period. There is also a shift in actors operating conflict versus post-
conflict environments. More NGOs and humanitarian actors operate in the post-conflict period, and 
much of the research they produce is often tied to the short-lived projects they have received funding 
for. These also tend to cover only specific issues or topics. 
 
Many of the problems faced in the post-conflict era have their roots in the way the military conflict 
was brought to an end. Military operations often follow the moral guideline that the end justifies the 
means, which in part is due to the lack of options in terms of how to minimize the cost of human lives 
in a conflict.  
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Niklas Saxén deals with very similar topics in his master‘s thesis ―Effective peacebuilding in a post-
conflict environment: problems and solutions with son-state armed groups‖. My focus is, however, in 
Kosovo, and even though Saxen has utilized much of the same material and as a consequence, make 
similar conclusions, my thesis is more case-specific.  
 
Camille Andrée Marie Monteux argues in her doctoral thesis ―‗Institution Building in Kosovo: The 
Role of International Actors and the Question of Legitimacy‘‖ that the international community failed 
to provide Kosovo with institutional structures capable of sustaining long-term economic, political and 
social peace and stability because of their inability to provide legitimacy for their actions and policies. 
Although this thesis does not deal with the legitimacy of institution building per se, the findings align 
with Monteux‘s arguments. 
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3 Establishment of the first security institutions 1999-2005  
 
The agreement on the undertaking of demilitarization and transformation by the KLA signed on the 
20
th
 of June 1999 assigned KFOR the task of overseeing the process of KLA‘s demilitarization within 
the next 90 days.
48
 The objective of the agreement was to have as many KLA combatants as possible 
return to civilian life. However, the majority of them were eventually recruited to join the mostly 
unarmed civilian emergency agency Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and the Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS) – later shortened to Kosovo Police (KP). The KPC was intended as a compromise between the 
KFOR‘s mandate to demilitarize KLA and the KLA leaders‘ demands that Kosovo would retain a 
standing force that in the future could potentially be transformed into an army.
49
 
 
A considerable number of former KLA combatants were also involved in the operation of locally or 
internationally-owned private security companies (PSCs) that emerged rapidly after the end of the 
conflict. Many PSC‘s were established by former KLA combatants. Similar developments can be 
found in other regions of the former Yugoslavia.
50
 Important leading figures of KLA also became 
influential politicians operating through two political parties; the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia 
Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK) and the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës, 
AAK) that largely dominated the post-war political arena in Kosovo.
51
 Hence, KLA was able to retain 
some of its influence and prestige despite having formally been disbanded.  
 
Notwithstanding the extensive foreign military presence and the fact that the UN had the legal 
responsibility of the province, an ethnic cleansing of the Serbs and other minorities and the 
destruction of hundreds of medieval Orthodox churches and monasteries took place during the first 
nine months. The KLA had intended to create an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo and the 
international community appeared to be unable to stop this development or lacked the motivation to 
do so, even though the KLA technically was no longer in operation. KLA leader Hashim Thaqi 
declared himself prime minister of the newly formed government, which the UN was unable to 
prevent, despite it being regarded as illegitimate. The Serbs developed a strong distrust of the entire 
UN administration from the beginning, and boycotted its institutions. This was made possible by the 
existing parallel structures upheld by the government in Belgrade.
52
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UNMIK 
 
UNMIK was established under United Nations Resolution 1244 which simultaneously authorized the 
deployment of NATO‘s military forces, KFOR, to Kosovo. Under the direction of the SRSG, 
UNMIK initially had four pillars that brought four international organisations and agencies together. 
The four original pillars were the following: 
 
Pillar I: Humanitarian Assistance, led by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR); 
Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the United Nations; 
Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), and 
Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, managed by the European Union (EU). 
 
A review and substantial revision of UNMIK and the entire policy towards Kosovo was launched by 
the UN in 2005 and continued the following year. After UNMIK had undergone an internal 
restructuring of its activities, the pillar structure was in large part dismantled in November 2006.  
 
UNMIK‘s work was hampered from the beginning by its slow establishment, caused by in part by the 
delay in the implementation of donors‘ funding commitments, as well as the absence of police and of 
judicial processes. The contradictory character of 1244 which calls for commitments both to 
―substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration‖ for Kosovo, and to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, complicated the policy-making on a range of 
issues, especially concerning the security sector.
53
 Kosovo‘s unresolved political status significantly 
affected the entire reconstruction effort.  Formally Kosovo was still part of Serbia, but in practice, 
Serbia had no longer any control over the province, which was ruled by the United Nations. 
 
There were also some disagreements between UNMIK and the PISG (The Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government) regarding the shared authority; UNMIK claimed that PISG tried to intervene and 
take control of areas where they had not received any authority while the PISG felt that UNMIK did 
not respect the PISG‘s legitimacy. As a result, many Albanians as well as Serbs had lost their faith in 
UNMIK. The main takeaway from the UNMIK rule includes the need to create an international 
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policing capability, the need to increase funding for post-conflict operations, and the importance of 
supporting and strengthening moderate democratic political groupings.
54
  
 
Overview of the KLA 
 
Ethnic violence in Kosovo is the product of ethnic, religious and socio-historic rivalries between the 
Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. Albanian resistance movements‘ political rival was typically personified 
in the Belgrade regime.
55
 The Kosovo Liberation Army was of the most prominent of these 
movements; however it formally experienced only a relatively short existence in the second half of the 
1990s.
56
 KLA represented the predominantly Albanian majority population of Kosovo, with the 
objective to gain independence from Serbia/Yugoslavia as well as put an end to the perceived 
oppression of the Albanians.
57
  
 
The events that lead to the emergence of KLA took place roughly around the time Milosevic‘s office 
was established. In 1989, Kosovo became an important part of his national policy which in KLA‘s 
rhetoric was identified as occupation, colonization and forceful emigration of Albanians out of 
Kosovo. Already the following year Kosovo's autonomy was reduced significantly. In the early 1990‘s 
the majority of the Albanians were removed from the public offices and the Albanian media was 
abolished. Almost overnight the Albanians began to protest Serbia in a passive, non-violent manner. 
This was not preceded by any actual decision but was partly because the Albanians had no military 
resources for resistance and gradually began to identify themselves as the opposite to whatever Serbia 
in their eyes stood for.  
 
The Kosovo Albanians created a parallel underground system consisting of for example schools run 
in private homes by volunteers. Economically the 1990‘s was a difficult era and primarily relied on the 
economic aid sent in from Albanians living abroad.
58
 During this time, the KLA was particularly active 
in utilizing the diaspora‘s resources. 
 
In light of the reductions in autonomy, the Albanians established a parallel parliament led by Ibrahim 
Rugova as the president. Although a number of political parties emerged in Kosovo just like in the 
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rest of Yugoslavia in 1989-1990, it was the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) that under the 
leadership of Ibrahim Rugova controlled the nation.   
 
With their passive resistance, Kosovo‘s informal shadow government and the LDK tried to draw 
international actors‘ attention to Kosovo‘s situation and ultimately get their support for Kosovo‘s bid 
for independence. Although LDK had a dominant position among Albanians, there were groups who 
did not support Ibrahim Rugova's nonviolent strategy. In the autumn of 1994, tension increased both 
within the LDK and in smaller parties like the liberals, and a more moderate faction that advocated 
Kosovo‘s autonomy though negotiations, surfaced.  
 
The resistance also grew against LDKs dominance over the communities. A number of senior 
moderate politicians left the LDK in October 1994, and the gap between the moderates and those 
who sought independence grew not only in Kosovo but throughout the diaspora, especially among 
Albanians in Germany, Switzerland and the United States.
59
 
 
An important change in the political climate occurred in 1995 as a direct result of the peace 
agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement). The failure of the Dayton agreement to 
secure financing and agree on the implementation of the curricula led to frustration and radicalization 
among Albanian students, and many saw dialogue as an ineffective way to push their agenda. The 
students‘ peaceful movement was the first movements to openly protest Belgrade‘s discriminatory 
policies while simultaneously attacking the LDK‘s passive resistance.60  
 
The peaceful resistance started to lose its supporters to the alternative radical and militant groups that 
gained more foothold in the mid 90‘s.61 The Dayton Agreement can be said to have systematically 
ignored the Serbian-Albanian relations, thus contributing to its shortfalls in addressing the question of 
Kosovo. The agreement also resulted in the UN lifting some of the sanctions against Serbia. As a 
result, Germany started to repatriate Albanian refugees. The conclusion that many Albanians drew 
from this was that their violent strategy had failed and that they needed to provoke violence and war, 
as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to get the international community's attention and be taken 
seriously. This caused a split in the Albanian elite that resulted in the formation of three fractions: a 
pacifist, an activist and a militant.
62
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The nonviolent resistance‘s failure paved way to groups whose modus operandi was armed conflict, as 
people‘s initiatives for finding a way out of the political dead end meant undertaking armed resistance. 
Due to lack of experience and the risks associated with illegal activities, these groups operated as 
individual units and were not coordinated by a joint body. The emergence of illegal groupings in 
Kosovo in the late 1980s and early 1990s was illustrative of the political environment, as the strongest 
growth occurred in the military faction.
63
 
 
The KLA was formed by a group of Albanians in exile between 1992 and 1993, with the help of a 
clandestine political organization, The Popular Movement of Kosovo/People's Movement of Kosovo 
(LPK). KLA was to act as a depoliticized guerrilla formation on the ground, while LPK would be in 
charge of the political and strategic decisions regarding the war.
64
 
 
Initially a small group of few members quickly grew to consist of perhaps a few hundred men, and 
began to conduct terrorist attacks across Kosovo. The attacks were at first targeted against the Serbian 
police and political leaders, but later also against Serb refugees and the Albanians who did not 
support the radical movement. 
 
LPK encouraged KLA to portray themselves as a liberation army that adhered to the Geneva 
International Convention of 1949 and other international treaties, such as the Right to Self-
Determination of the UN Charter, and that of Helsinki and Paris, could not be seen as initiators of an 
international armed conflict.
65
  
 
Many of the LPK‘s central members were based in Sweden, Germany and Switzerland, and this was 
the group from which the KLA emerged. KLA attracted members mainly in the diaspora and from 
some of the clans in the area around Drenica in central Kosovo. One of the leaders was Hashim 
Thaqi and later Adem Demaqi became the representative for KLA‘s political wing. 
 
KLA and LPK weren‘t the only groups operating in Kosovo, and it is important to distinguish 
between these different actors. Another military branch known as FARK (the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Kosovo) was created by the LDK-led government‘s Ministry of Defence. FARK was the 
military wing of the government of the Albanian parallel system and was controlled by Bujar Bukoshi, 
the LDK‘s prime minister in exile.  
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FARK was primarily funded through tax revenues and by former Albanian officers in the Yugoslav 
army. KLA however, contained more radical elements, and was financed largely by criminal networks 
successfully established in Western Europe. At first, KLA was not in any way connected to FARK 
and there were even open clashes between them in 1998-1999. Eventually KLA surpassed FARK as 
the primary armed force, and many FARK soldiers later passed over the KLA and thus parts of 
FARK merged with the KLA.
66
  
 
When the Albanian government collapsed in 1997 and the country fell into anarchy, new 
opportunities to acquire arms through criminal activity such as by raiding weapons depots became 
available. KLA and other rebel groups could now arm themselves and began to operate in Albania as 
well. Officially the KLA at this time was labelled as terrorists by the Clinton administration, but some 
sources claim that they received support from the CIA and the British intelligence to act as resistance 
group opposing Slobodan Milosevic.
67
 
 
KLA‘s military activity against the Serbian police and civilians, but also against Albanians who had 
dealings with the Serbs or were considered too moderate in their approach, escalated towards the end 
of 1997. In some regions they also attacked the supporters of the LDK and FARK. Although this 
created fear among some Albanians, the time was now ripe for KLA to provoke enough violence to 
get international attention. KLA had camps in Albania and pursued low level guerrilla warfare, but 
did not yet have enough resources to train larger units. 
 
On the 28
th
 of February 1998, Serb troops killed 26 members of Albanians families in Drenica. On 
the 4
th
 of March they attacked a famous guerrilla leader Adem Jashari and his group, most of whom 
were part of his family. The Serbian forces killed 58 Albanians in Jashari‘s group. These killings 
known as the Drenica massacres had two immediate consequences; they provoked rage among 
Albanians throughout Kosovo as well as in the diaspora, and the leaders in various parts of the 
province now decided to support the armed uprising. Furthermore, the Albanian-American 
community that until then had supported the LDK, now decided to finance the KLA. Both of these 
factors amounted to a success for the KLA and the organization grew to consist of several thousand 
members.  
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The international community at this time disapproved both the Serbs‘ excessive violence and the 
"terrorist acts" by the KLA. This was repeated by both the so-called Contact Group (the US, Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy and Russia) and the United Nations, including the Security Council 
resolutions, 1160 and 1199, with the resolution 1160 stating that the Council condemns ―--the use of 
excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as 
well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all 
external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms and training.‖68 
 
Against the backdrop of the Dayton Agreement, these statements held little value for the KLA. The 
LDK, on the other hand, made some attempts to negotiate with Belgrade but they were unsuccessful 
as the Serb troops continued to attack the KLA. The LDK grew weaker and began to lose their 
standing in Kosovo. 
 
As Serbian military operations continued in Kosovo, the US gradually revised their position on KLA, 
and no longer regarded it as a terrorist organization, and even threatened Serbia with air-bombing. 
During the second half of 1998, the United States shifted its support from LDK to the KLA. This 
proved to the KLA that their strategy was successful.  
 
In January 1999, the Contact group held a meeting in Rambouillet, France, to deal with the situation 
in Kosovo. Formally the meeting was to be a negotiation, but in practice it was an ultimatum for 
Serbia from the United States, who now sided with the KLA. For instance, the Serbian and the 
Albanian delegations never met. Also the document presented to the Serbs was more or less final, 
and there were no real negotiations to be had on the content. LDK was completely marginalized in 
the Albanian delegation. The delegation was led instead by KLA leader Hashim Thaqi, and the rest 
were representatives of some smaller parties and independent actors. This basically validated KLA‘s 
standing as the official ally of the US.
69
  
 
3.1 Demilitarization of the KLA - the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process 
 
The international agreements signed following the end of the NATO‘s bombing campaign responded 
to one of the first challenges of post-war Kosovo; how to adequately address the demobilization of the 
KLA combatants, whose estimated number after the war was around 20,000.
70
 The Resolution 1244 
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demanded that ―the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive 
actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization‖.71 It further required that 
demilitarization principles and modalities should be carried out in close consultation between the 
international security presence and the office of the UN SRSG. In pursuance of the above, on the 14
th
 
of July 1999 KFOR and UNMIK decided to consider the establishment of measures to accompany 
the reintegration into civil society of those demilitarised KLA members who will not be absorbed into 
the civil police.
72
  
 
The KLA had not been a signatory to the Military Technical Agreement which set out ―to establish a 
durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any Forces of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia 
enter into, re-enter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and the Air 
Safety Zone (ASZ)--. The State Governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force ("KFOR") will deploy following 
the adoption of the UNSCR referred to in paragraph 1 and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with 
the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of 
Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission.‖73  
 
The agreement titled ―Undertaking of Demilitarization and transformation by the KLA‖ was signed 
on the 20
th
 of June 1999 and stipulated the terms and conditions for the KLA to be demilitarised. The 
framework for the agreement is based on the Resolution 1244, the obligations agreed to at 
Rambouillet and the public commitments made by the Kosovar Albanian Rambouillet delegation.
74
  
 
This document was signed by the then-KFOR Commander General Mike Jackson, the Chief of Staff 
of the KLA General Agim Çeku, the Director of the Political Directorate of the KLA Hashim Thaçi, 
and in the presence of NATO‘s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley 
K. Clark, and UNMIK‘s Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Bernard Kouchner.  
 
The agreement set out the terms, the concrete steps and the timeline for demobilizing KLA 
combatants, stating that KLA ―agrees to comply with all of the obligations of this Undertaking and to ensure 
that with immediate effect all UCK forces in Kosovo and in neighbouring countries will observe the provisions 
of this Undertaking, will refrain from all hostile or provocative acts, hostile intent and freeze military movement 
in either direction across International borders or the boundary between Kosovo and other parts of the FRY, 
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or any other actions inconsistent with the spirit of UNSCR 1244. The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit 
themselves publicly to demilitarise in accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23, refrain from activities which 
jeopardise the safety of international governmental and non-governmental personnel including KFOR, and to 
facilitate the deployment and operation of KFOR.‖75  
 
With a different timeline set for each step, the KLA was expected to have completed the processes 
for their demilitarization and ceased wearing either military uniforms or insignia of the KLA within 90 
days.
76
 The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC), comprised of COMKFOR as Chair, 
representatives from KFOR and NATO and the interim civil administration for Kosovo. JIC ensured 
the compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of all forces and the 
investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the undertaking.
77
  
 
The demilitarization of the KLA was one of NATO‘s first priorities and the demilitarization 
agreement provided the legal framework for it. For NATO, the complete dissolution of KLA and the 
combatants‘ return to civilian life was essential in order to prevent any succession, and there was not 
much eagerness to transform KLA structures into another security mechanism in post-war Kosovo.
78
  
 
However, the continuation of KLA‘s legacy held a significant symbolic value for the Kosovar 
Albanians, and a vast majority of the population considered the KLA to be the army of the 
independent Kosovo, and the KLA leadership was aware of its symbolism and prestige.
79
 KLA was 
able to leverage this into avoiding a complete dissolution by preserving some of its hierarchy and 
insignia. 
 
There are many similarities with the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, with the exception that Bosnia‘s 
internal regime and external status were essentially settled with the Dayton Agreement, while 
Kosovo‘s has remained unsettled. The international community was therefore unable to deal with the 
various power groups in Kosovo, in particular the former KLA, whose standing on Kosovo‘s status 
was univocal.
80
 
 
The status question has probably been one of the most important factors explaining why the 
international community was unable to draft an overall plan on Kosovo‘s security sector. The whole 
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process has remained fragmented and incomplete – with serious repercussions, both locally and 
regionally.
81
  
 
The non-resolution of Kosovo‘s status question has meant that since the security sector could not be 
developed in a way a sovereign state‘s security sector normally would, international actors took over 
jurisdiction related functions for the protectorate. Therefore the question of national security sector 
institutions was not addressed from the beginning, which undermined the comprehensiveness of the 
DDR efforts as well as the local police and municipal reform.
82
  
 
Kosovo's status has been a major issue not only because of the conflict between Serbs and Albanians, 
but also because the international development assistance is generally only given to states or 
governmental actors. The World Bank, for instance, requires a state to sign the agreements and since 
Kosovo's status was uncertain, it was not able to obtain the BIC/SWIFT –codes.83 Hence, Kosovo has 
not been signatory to many agreements allowing international cooperation. 
 
IOM‘s Information, Counseling and Referral Service 
 
The IOM-implemented Information Counselling & Referral Service (ICRS) was designed to assist 
demilitarised KLA combatants to reintegrate back into civilian life, but there was little demand for the 
vocational training available through the program.
84
 Therefore there was an increased focus on self-
employment. A significant share of the former KLA members remained in the security domain, i.e. 
KPC and the private sector.  
 
Regardless, the IOM program was a relative success even if its vocational training sometimes seemed 
to be far ahead of economic recovery. Roughly half of the combatants returned to their prior 
positions and around 5,000 of them joined the KPC and some 2,500 in KPS.
85
 Former combatants‘ 
reintegration efforts take time to achieve full socio-economic reintegration in order to achieve a 
completed situation of demobilization.  
 
There is clearly a need for job creation programs, particularly the formation of small and medium-
sized enterprises where the international community could play a more important role in making 
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credit available to entrepreneurs. At the same time, a clear economic policy for Kosovo has just begun 
to emerge, although it is being hampered by conflicts among the donors about the economic future of 
the territory.  
 
One of the major assumptions that have not been fulfilled is that of adequate funding — the budgets of 
the IOM, KPC and KPS combined are a mere fraction of the cost of the UN‘s administration of 
Kosovo. It seems evident that more funds should be set aside for this purpose, as the successful 
reintegration of former fighters is a necessary prerequisite to calm the region.  
 
It is standard practice in Demilitarization, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs to 
provide demilitarized combatants with stipends so they can support themselves and their dependents 
until reintegration and income generating activities begin.  However, due to the timing of the arrival of 
funding and its quantity in Kosovo for the program, stipends could not be offered to demilitarized 
combatants. This forced many former combatants to remain dependent upon the KLA structure for 
support and hence negating some of the intended outcomes of demobilization.
86
 
 
The shortfalls of the demilitarization efforts 
 
The demilitarization agreement set a clear timeline for the disarmament process, but the outcome 
didn‘t live up to the expectations. The international community was unable to divide the different 
responsibilities between themselves and take action early on, which in turn contributed to a 
fragmented demilitarization process. The security vacuum created by the Serbian military‘s 
withdrawal was filled with parallel security and justice structures organized by local communities, while 
the UNMIK and KFOR were slow to deploy or not fully operational despite the substantial powers 
given to them.
87
  
 
The lack of law enforcement and unclear legal situations allowed KLA elites to create economic and 
political niches during the first six months of the Protectorate, although policing and the judiciary 
remained weak spots in UNMIK‘s administration.  
 
Some elements in the initial stages of the security sector reformation can be considered to have 
suffered from this. First, an incomplete turning in of weapons was caused by the lack of all-
encompassing weapons collection program that would have encouraged KLA and other actors to do 
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so. KLA surrendered 10,000 weapons in the summer of 1999, which can be interpreted as more of a 
gesture of goodwill that allowed both KFOR and the KLA leadership to save their face, rather than as 
a testament of an effective disarmament of the KLA.
88
   
 
This led to the assumption that numerous Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) have been 
stowed away ‗for a rainy day‘ or transferred to Albania, South Serbia or Macedonia, or ended up in 
the hands of organized crime. With respect to the disarmament of the KLA, KFOR never seriously 
questioned the symbolic nature of the hand-over of the weapons.  
 
A UNDP study shows that small arms misuse may represent an internal threat to the Kosovar society. 
Compared to other countries in the Central and Eastern European region, small arms are used in a 
disproportionately high number of homicides and robberies. A Small Arms Baseline Assessment 
(SABA) household survey found that assault rifles and pistols continue to be trafficked from Serbia 
and Albania, and are owned by a wide array of actors including civilians, organized criminal actors, 
and political factions.
89
  
 
Second, the role of the KPC was ambiguous from the start; was it a humanitarian organization for the 
International Community, or the core for a future Kosovar army? The hardliners and criminal 
elements were never effectively removed from the KLA structure or the society as a whole; hence, 
their influence on the demilitarised combatants remained, often contrary to expectations of civil 
society.
90
 As a result, the KLA prevented the integration of other Albanian units into the KPC.  
 
Organized crime, such as smuggling, trafficking and drugs trade is an enormous problem with former 
KLA combatants. The KLA‘s close ties with the extremist-nationalist armed Albanian groups in the 
South of Serbia and Macedonia have contributed to this issue. The trans-border weapons trade and 
widespread availability of SALW played an important part in creating a perception of the KLA as 
victor.‖91 
 
Collier‘s framework of macro- and microinsecurity defines the threats presented by combatants. He 
argues that at the micro-insecurity level gainful and rewarding employment or means of livelihood and 
a sense of community significantly reduce the potential threat that the former combatants might 
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present to the society. Therefore micro-insecurity can be defined as a fear that the individual is the 
victim of crime. Collier stresses the importance of successful demobilization and reintegration in 
order to prevent the problem of insecurity being compounded in the society.
92
 
 
Collier also argues that the unsuccessful reintegration of former combatants may present a threat at 
the macro level as well. Dissatisfaction, grievances or the imbalance in socio-economic and political 
structures that led the combatants to take arms and fight in the first place may encourage them to 
remobilize if these issues continue to be neglected, ineffectively dealt with and unresolved. According 
to Collier, the fear that the state will be overthrown by insurrection is associated with macro-insecurity, 
and can be exacerbated by an unresolved conflict.
93
 
 
As the KLA members committed a wide array of acts of violence against civilians, prosecuting the 
alleged perpetrators, as well as launching pro-active reconciliation policies, is essential. Investigating 
and documenting all gross violations of human rights, identifying those involved and enforcing judicial 
accountability is important in order to minimize macro- and microinsecurity within the society
94
 was 
problematic in Kosovo from the start as the KLA combatants enjoyed considerable popular support 
and their actions are generally not perceived as punishable.
95
 
 
The Kosovo Police and integration 
 
The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was established as a part of UNMIK‘s institution-building mandate. 
UNMIK was responsible for the recruitment, while the training was organized by OSCE. KPS 
operated under the authority of the UNMIK Police Commissioner (Pillar II, later Pillar I)
96
 and was 
in close cooperation with the UNMIK police.
97
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Figure 3. KPS under the UNMIK Pillars 
98
 
 
 
 
 
The OSCE Mission in Kosovo was in charge of setting up the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) 
and selecting and training interested applicants. Members were chosen from all communities living in 
Kosovo, with quotas for former KLA combatants (50%), former Yugoslav policemen (20%), minority 
groups (15%) and women (25%)
99
, although not all of these quotas were met.  
 
Following the independence and the passing of new legislation, Kosovo Police Service was reformed 
and its name shortened to Kosovo Police (KP). The KP, as well as KPC, absorbed a large number or 
former KLA combatants. Although multiethnicity was stressed from the beginning, it was not as 
visible in the outcome, as approximately 25% of the 7,000 KP members were former KLA soldiers. 
As out of 3,000 active KPC members, 70% came from the KLA, there were roughly as many former 
KLA in the KPS as in the active body of the KPC.
100
  
 
KPC was composed almost entirely of former KLA members, and nearly half the slots in the Kosovo 
Police Service (KPS) were also reserved for former KLA members. This led many to fear that former 
KLA might unduly influence the KPS. UNMIK police were probably counting on that the percentage 
of KLA in the KPS would decrease since the former KLA already controlled the KPC. There were 
also some concerns over the potential dominance and influence of KPC on the KPS, and that they 
might become battling public security forces both established and funded by the UN and NATO.  
 
According to a U.S. Department of Justice report ―people with records of human rights abuses must 
be excluded from newly formed local police forces. Not only may a new police force quickly become 
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tainted by association with discredited personnel, but old behavior patterns may also be passed on to 
new and impressionable recruits. It is especially dangerous to "roll over" whole units into the new 
police, even if they possess unusual skills, such as intelligence gathering or criminal investigation. 
They bring with them a cohesiveness that hampers change.‖101 
 
Although KPS successfully contributed to substantial improvement in policing, the lasting influence of 
the old KLA structures within the force continues to be a cause of concern. It seems that the KLA has 
in part reverted to its roots in as parts of the old KLA have been integrated first into the self- 
governing and paramilitary structures of UN-administered Kosovo, and later to the sovereign 
government itself, the more radical forces now act abroad. With regard to the demobilization of the 
KLA in Kosovo, there is no doubt that some radical and criminal members of the old structures have 
survived the transformation intact. 
 
KFOR, UNMIK and demilitarization 
 
KFOR‘s control over the implementation of the demilitarization agreement suffered from a lack of 
coordination between the individual KFOR zones. At times the central command chain of KFOR was 
undermined by specific country regulations as certain zones were administered by them. 
Furthermore, control of the KPC, as well as illegal activities on the part of former KLA members, 
required policing and investigation skills that the militarily trained officers lacked.  
 
Due to the slow establishment of UNMIK, the UN International Police force did not become fully 
operational as quickly as expected and was significantly understaffed throughout its existence. KFOR 
therefore took upon police work, even though they were not trained for it and only some national 
contingents were ready to undertake these tasks.
102 
 
The high turnover rate of KFOR and UNMIK personnel lead to a loss of institutional knowledge. It 
seems more reasonable to rotate personnel in a way that secures continuity. Furthermore, some 
KFOR sectors were understaffed with respect to KPC control. This is of particular importance if KPC 
units or individual members do not follow regulations.  
 
The lack of planning, as well as the fact that there was no entry or exit strategy, were one of the biggest 
problems of the intervention. The outcome of the wars of intervention can be unexpected and 
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unintended, but NATO was not prepared to deal with the aftermath of the military defeat of the Serb 
forces. Bureaucratic sluggishness, competing national agendas, budgetary problems and an unclear 
division of labor demonstrated the political negligence of UNMIK and KFOR.
103
  
 
The unresolved status of Kosovo was one of the major obstacles preventing a complete 
demobilization and disarmament of KLA, as former combatants retained their weapons in case 
another liberation war were to occur. Even the KPC, although technically a civilian institution, was 
preparing for such a scenario.  
 
The status question was especially relevant to the KPC, as for most Kosovars it represented the 
preliminary design on a national army, but UNMIK could not allow the establishment of such a force 
under the terms of Regulation 1244.  The issue reflected negatively to the relations between KFOR, 
UNMIK and the KPC from the start.   
 
There was a need to unify civil and military aspects of the protectorate administration and to create 
accountable and transparent chains of an administrative division of labor as well as subordination—a 
lesson one could have learned from post-Dayton experiences in Bosnia. As the International Crisis 
Group noted; ―The continuing lack of effective inter-entity legal cooperation between law 
enforcement, administrative and judicial authorities of both entities is an ongoing impediment to the 
strengthening of the judiciary and judicial independence. Cross-entity organised crime and accessing 
documents from the other entity are still two areas where there must be an increase in co-operation‖104 
 
3.2 Kosovo Protection Corps and Kosovo Security Force 
 
90 days after the demilitarization agreement was signed, UNMIK promulgated Regulation No. 1999/8 
on the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) on the 20
th
 of September 1999. UNMIK 
provided the legal framework, decided upon the locations of KPC garrisons, and financed projects, 
but the training and reintegration of the KLA combatants were delegated to IOM and OSCE. 
 
The Joint Interim Administrative Structure Administration licensed the transformation of the KLA 
into the Kosovo Police Force (KPF) and Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),
105
 which in this study marks 
the first developments in the security sector within the timeframe of consideration. In order to create 
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legitimacy for local management, an international police and judicial corps were established to train 
and work together with the locals. 
 
The KPC was established as a civilian emergency response agency, a disarmed and demilitarized 
successor to the KLA.  The regulation expressly provides that the KPC ―shall not have any role in law 
enforcement or the maintenance of law and order‖.106 By the time KPC was established, the process of 
disarmament was complete, and the KLA had handed over around 9,000 small arms, 800 machine 
guns, 300 anti-tank mines, 1,200 mines, 178 mortars, 27,000 hand grenades, 1,000 kg of explosives 
and over 5 million rounds of ammunition to KFOR.
107
 
 
The regulation 1999/8 defines the Kosovo Protection Corps‘ tasks as including the following: ―(a) 
Provide disaster response services; (b) Perform search and rescue; (c) Provide a capacity for humanitarian 
assistance in isolated areas; (d) Assist in demining; and (e) Contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and 
communities.‖108 In 2006, those tasks were expanded, after the promulgation of an amendment to the 
regulation No. 2006/3 to comprise the following: ―(a) provide disaster response services; (b) perform search 
and rescue; (c) provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; (d) assist in demining; (e) 
contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and reconstruction for communities, including monitoring unoccupied 
reconstructed homes of minority communities and other humanitarian tasks; and (f) perform ceremonial 
duties within its scope as a civilian emergency service agency, in accordance with directives of the KPC 
Coordinator and KFOR.‖109 
 
In essence, the KPC was a civilian emergency organization, equipped and trained to carry out rapid 
response tasks for public safety in times of emergency and humanitarian assistance.
110
 Its mission was 
also set out in the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, which came 
into effect in 2001.  
 
KPC was a solution to a policy dilemma KFOR and UN negotiators faced when they wanted to 
respect their mandate to demilitarize Kosovo while the KLA leaders were determined to maintain 
some form of standing force. The KLA held the view that someday Kosovo would be independent 
and would need its own army, an ideal shared by most Kosovo Albanians.
111
 In the eyes of the 
Albanian majority population, the KPC was always viewed as more than a civilian organization. If not 
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an army as such, it was certainly considered to be an army in waiting, as well as the direct successor of 
the KLA.
112
  
 
To secure the opportunity for the KLA combatants to return to civilian life, the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) was charged with the responsibility of registering and integrating 
KLA combatants, as well as building capacities for the new KPC members in the area of civil 
protection.
113
 The training, organized by IOM, was geared to promote basic individual and 
organizational skills, personal responsibility and discipline. Specialized training on civil protection was 
also offered.  
 
It should be noted that the structure and organization of the KPC remained to a large extent the same 
as that of the KLA. Most of the commanding officers were former KLA fighters. Out of 5,000 
members, 3,000 were on active duty, and 2,000 were reserve members. However, unlike its 
predecessor, the KPC‘s profile was designed to be multi-ethnic (in addition to being a non-religious 
and apolitical organization). Officially, UNMIK and KFOR officials pushed for the creation of an 
organization that would be representative of all ethnic groups living in Kosovo, but minority 
representation was minimal and virtually non-existent from the Serb minority community.
114
 
 
In order to guarantee multiethnicity in the forces, ten percent of the 5000 membership slots were 
reserved for members of minority groups. However, the KPC suffered from underrepresentation of 
minorities regardless; some reports even mention KPC recruiters being assaulted because of their 
efforts to enlist minorities.
115
 Because KPC was generally considered as the successor of KLA, 
attempts to recruit Serb members in its ranks in the early phases weren‘t successful.   
 
To address this issue, UNMIK considered forming a separate KPC Serb unit in early 2000, but the 
suggestion was quickly dropped as it would have posed a challenge to the KPC‘s operational chain of 
command, and it was strongly opposed by the Albanians.
116
  
 
Recruiting members from the minority communities remained an issue throughout the KPC‘s 
mandate. UNMIK‘s ―Standards for Kosovo report‖ highlighted the importance of minority 
representation. KPC was to fulfill four major prerequisites, and according to the report; ―1. The KPC 
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was expected to act in a transparent, disciplined and professional manner; 2. the KPC should be 
representative of all the people of Kosovo; 3. The KPC should be proactive in recruiting minority 
communities; and 4. The KPC was to be financed by the Kosovo budget in a transparent manner‖.117  
 
KPC‘s hierarchical structure was also problematic for the beginning, as there was disproportionately 
heavy representation in the upper levels. Many former combatants who had held senior positions with 
the KLA held similar or higher posts in the KPC. Bekaj suggests that the war legacy ―counted for 
seniority with the KPC, which in turn could also have deflated the ambitions of its younger members, 
causing there to be little rotation within the KPC personnel.
118
 
  
The reason why NATO allowed this was probably because they somehow were hoping to keep the 
old KLA officer corps under control by creating KPC, and consequently smooth out and avoid any 
further confrontations between NATO and KLA by enabling them to influence their standing in the 
KPC. For KLA leaders, this presented a way to conserve their force structure, identity, and authority 
while still appearing as willing to cooperate with the international actors. Whether they shared the 
same end goals for KPC - which was to demilitarize KLA - is debatable.  
 
The KPC‘s true intentions became apparent in the negotiations leading to its creation. There was 
much dispute over the name itself, which in Albanian has a distinctly military and national defense 
connotation. Efforts to change the name failed as General Ceku and his team refused to yield. 
Another sticking point was the use of military ranks in the KLA, with the KLA leaders insisting on 
titles like general and colonel, while UN and NATO wanted more civilian sounding ranks. KLA also 
demanded military-style uniforms.
119
 
 
The gap between NATO‘s intentions and the KPC‘s attitude was revealed in General Ceku‘s speech 
on Sept 21 1999, marking the KLA‘s ‗farewell‘ parade through Pristina ―Today, we are ending the 
march of freedom but we are starting the march of the future for the independent Kosovo and its 
army.‖120 Ceku has later repeated this rhetoric in several occasions in connection with KPC‘s 
successor, Kosovo Security Force (KSF), which also is only perceived as the next stepping stone 
towards a national army.   
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KPC had all the trappings of an army or police force in waiting, and the dangers of the KLA ‗rolling 
over‘ into both the KPC and the KPS were perceived as a real threat. Post-conflict peacekeeping 
missions have been pressed to enlist demobilized combatants who allegedly possess management and 
supervisory skills that are in desperately short supply among civilians.
121
  
 
Since the KPC formally came into existence in January 2000, many in Kosovo, including Albanians 
worried that its present and possible future activities might violate the Regulation 1999/8. Some 
Albanians and many KFOR and CIVPOL officers believed that a major security issue is whether 
members who violate the law will be punished.  
 
Some of KPC‘s more questionable traits include arrests and detention, interrogations or ‗informative 
talks‘, searches and seizures of property and persons, enforcement of illegal taxation schemes, 
evictions from property, and crowd control.
122
 This was sometimes overlooked by KFOR officials and 
UNMIK police who invited KPC to play this role, which is essentially a ‗maintaining law and order‘ 
function prohibited by Regulation 1999/8. The ongoing shortage of UNMIK police created a ‗security 
gap‘ quickly filled by KPC in some regions.123  
 
Illegal activities and human rights abuses by KPC have been reported since its inception. In the 
preliminary phase, starting in Sept 1999 when former KLA members began to apply for membership 
in the KPC, the Human Rights Unit of the SRSG‘s office, OSCE, and the UNCHR investigated 
numerous and well-founded allegations of criminal activity by KPC applicants. KPC have also known 
to have threatened judges, especially when a former KLA member has been arrested. Judges would 
not reveal these threats out of fear and the knowledge that CIVPOL and KFOR could not protect 
them.
124
  
 
KPC‘s behavior gradually improved when KFOR took more serious measures, with at least reported 
compliance violations dropping. But the overall problem of organized crime and the KPC‘s links to 
violence remained. A confidential UN report prepared in late 2000 noted: ―Many KPC members, in 
some case high-ranking KPC officials, have ties with criminal organizations‖.125  
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Members of the Joint Task Force on Minorities regularly conveyed information and concern about 
KPC violations of Regulation 8 and its members‘ violent and criminal activities to KFOR 
representatives, but KFOR chose to downplay the gravity of the problem. Perhaps in order to 
demonstrate local involvement, KPC was treated as an independent actor in a way that for the KPS 
never was. Due to more oversight, KPS became far more trusted among Kosovo‘s population, 
including all ethnic groups, than the KPC.
126
  
 
The dissolution of KPC and the establishment of KSF 
 
KPC‘s war legacy and its identification as a direct inheritor of the KLA suggested a reform in the eyes 
of the international community, as it was perceived as a potential threat to the internal stability. The 
Ahtisaari Plan and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo called for the dissolution of the KPC 
and the creation of a new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force (KSF) from scratch. 
The KSF was to be lightly armed, and would not possess heavy weapons, such as tanks, heavy artillery 
or offensive air capability.
127
  
 
According to Article 5 of Annex VIII of the Ahtisaari Proposal: ―Initially, the KSF shall be primarily 
responsible for crisis response, explosive ordinance disposal, and civil protection. In addition, the 
KSF will be designed and prepared to fulfil other security functions, not appropriate for the police or 
other law enforcement organizations.‖128 Article 6 of the same document envisages the dissolution of 
the KPC: ―The KPC shall be disbanded. The IMP, in consultation with the ICR and Kosovo, shall 
exercise executive oversight of the KPC, and shall decide on the timing of its disbandment. The 
disbandment is to be within one year of this Settlement coming into force. A Demobilization and 
Reintegration process is to be developed by the International Community for these KPC retirees.‖129  
 
For its part, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo states: ―The Kosovo Protection Corps shall 
be dissolved within one year after entry into force of this constitution. Until such dissolution, the 
International Military Presence, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative and the 
Republic of Kosovo, shall exercise executive authority over the Kosovo Protection Corps and shall 
decide on the schedule of its dissolution.‖130  
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On the establishment of the new force, it stipulates the following: ―The Kosovo Security Force shall 
serve as a national security force for the Republic of Kosovo and may send its members abroad in full 
conformity with its international responsibilities [...] The Kosovo Security Force shall be professional, 
reflect ethnic diversity of the people of the Republic of Kosovo and shall be recruited from among the 
citizens of the Republic of Kosovo.‖131  
 
KPC‘s deactivation began in in January 2009 and came to a completion after the declaration of 
Kosovo‘s independence. The KSF was formally created immediately after KPC‘s mandate ended. 
The dignified dissolution of the KPC was essential for many Kosovar politicians and military 
personnel, especially war veterans, as it was vital that they were offered an acceptable scheme of early 
retirement or reintegration.  
 
However, the government only approved the draft law on Kosovo Liberation Army war veterans in 
February 2014, after years of debating issues including the financial implications of the draft law, 
namely the costs of it. The ―dignified‖ aspect of the dissolution was especially important in order to 
respect the symbolism of it; with the dissolution of the KPC the people would also witness the end of 
the KLA legacy.
132
 There was a major effort by the international community to facilitate the process in 
order to support the reintegration of the KPC members into civil society, instead of simply recruiting 
them to the KSF. 
 
Whereas the KPC was a tightly controlled and purely civilian protection corps whose oversight was a 
reserved competence of the SRSG, the KSF was to be directly accountable to the Ministry of the 
Kosovo Security Force. The President of the Republic of Kosovo is the Supreme Commander of the 
KSF. This represented an integrated model of civilian control under civilian governmental and 
international control by KFOR and a new International Civilian Representative. 
 
According to the Law on the Kosovo Security Force, as an all- volunteer force, it is designed to fulfil 
―security functions not appropriate for the police or other law enforcement organisations‖133. It was 
recommended to consist of an active component of a maximum of 2,500 personnel and a reserve 
component of a maximum of 800 personnel.
134
 The KSF‘s emergency response component consists 
of search and rescue, demining, hazardous materials, fire-fighting and other humanitarian assistance 
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capabilities. The President has the competence to authorise the deployment of the KSF to peace 
support operations abroad. The legislation also allows foresees a possible review of the amount of 
KSF personnel.
135
 
 
Article 10 of the Law on the Kosovo Security Force, which describes its missions and tasks, states: 
―The Kosovo Security Force shall be lightly armed and possess no heavy weapons, such as tanks, heavy 
artillery or offensive air capability. Any changes will be determined by the International Military Presence, in 
coordination with the International Civilian Representative. A full review of these limits to be conducted no 
earlier than 5 years from the date this Law enters into force. The initial tasks of the Kosovo Security Force shall 
be: a) to participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations. This will include 
operations outside the territory of the Republic of Kosovo where invited to do so; b) to assist civil authorities in 
responding to natural and other disasters and emergencies, including as part of a regional or international 
response effort, c) to conduct explosive ordnance disposal, d) to assist civil authorities through civil protection 
operations‖.136  
 
A relatively high percentage of the KSF consisted of former KPC members as they possessed most of 
the skills required for the new force. The amount of former KLA combatants, however, was 
significantly lower than in KPC (figure 2.0). The new force, although it was not called an army, was 
again seen by people as the next step towards it.   
 
This army-in-waiting option was favoured by the former KLA/KPC leadership and tolerated by 
KFOR and UNMIK, and led to long-term civilian reintegration of a large amount of former KLA 
combatants. This outcome served the interests of international stakeholders as well as the Kosovars, 
and both sides have been able to compromise on this form of co-optation of security provisions in 
post-war Kosovo.
137
 
 
Roughly 20,000 of the registered KLA members could be regarded active members, and an 
additional 4,552, most of whom held a higher rank, were ―demobilized‖ into the KPC. 
Approximately 1700 were absorbed by the KPS. KSF later emp1oyed some 1,000 KPC officers.
138
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Figure 2. KLA members in KPC and KSF 2000-2011
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4 The initial handover of responsibilities 2005-2008 
 
During the UNMIK era, the security sector in Kosovo grew to consist of international and local 
mechanisms that, arguably, did not take account of existing structures and capabilities to the extent 
that may have been necessary. The democratic oversight and control of armed forces was split 
between different actors, which meant that they weren‘t carried out in the most efficient manner. 
UNMIK Police and KFOR were accountable to their own political decision makers and the KPC and 
KPS, although they were local, remained under the executive competencies of the SRSG.
140
  
 
In December 2005, the SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen signed three Regulations establishing the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Kosovo Judicial Council as a part of the 
Kosovo Government. These institutions together with the regulation on the framework and guiding 
principles of the Kosovo Police Service marked the implementation of the first phase of UNMIK's 
transfer of competencies in the field of police and justice.
141
 
 
The talks on Kosovo‘s future political status began by 2005 and the need for a review of the security 
mechanisms became increasingly more prevalent. In 2005 a comprehensive Internal Security Sector 
Review (ISSR) was put together by the Security Sector Development Advisory Team comprised of 
the UNDP, in cooperation with Kosovo Government, British Government and other stakeholders. 
The review covered areas from policing to civil emergency services and even healthcare and the 
economy, and to offered recommendations for the institutions concerned.
142
 The ISSR marked the 
first step towards the transfer of responsibilities in the security sector to the local institutions, and 
placed emphasis on strengthening the newly established ministries. 
 
The President and Prime Minister were to have an executive say in Kosovo‘s security institutions, and 
the Assembly was to exercise its role by creating the relevant parliamentary committees for internal 
affairs and intelligence in order to ensure democratic oversight of Kosovo‘s security mechanisms.143 
The political developments that took place after the ISSR was concluded largely reflected the findings 
of the report.  
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In 2005, the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was appointed as the Special Envoy of the UN 
Secretary-General. Ahtisaari then took over the negotiations that were held in Vienna in several 
rounds during 2006 and 2007 between Pristina and Belgrade regarding Kosovo‘s future political 
status, although there was little progress at the time.
144
 
 
At the same time the Vetevendosje movement, who promote a revolutionary agenda based on self-
determination, demonstrated and targeted attacks against Serbs and Orthodox monasteries and 
mobilized the Albanian discontent. UNMIK decided that the municipal elections to be held in the 
autumn would be postponed until after the Ahtisaari report. In September 2006, the Serbian 
government in Belgrade drafted a new Serbian constitution in which Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo 
was highlighted. This was followed in late October by a referendum, also among Serbs in Kosovo, 
and the new Constitution was adopted in November 2006 by the Parliament in Belgrade.
145
 
 
Martti Ahtisaari decided to postpone his report until after the parliamentary elections would be held 
in Serbia in January 2007. At the same time the Albanian population and especially in the radical 
factions grew more and more frustrated. On the Albanian Flag Day November the 28
th
, Vetevendosje 
and KLA veterans organized demonstrations that led to attacks on UN headquarters in Pristina.
146
 
The UN police deployed tear gas to dissolve the demonstration, after which Vetevendosje now 
claimed openly that the UN administration was an occupation of Kosovo. 
 
In September 2006, The National Assembly of Serbia made a proposal that granted total autonomy 
for Kosovo but with the international police controlling the borders. The only requirement was that 
Serbia's sovereignty would be respected and that Kosovo would formally remain part of Serbia.
147
 This 
was rejected by the Albanians, whose claim for independence was based on national self-
determination and the subjectivity of the ‗‗nation of Kosovo‖. This principle has been driven by the 
international community and constitutes the basis for state formation processes in the entire Europe 
after the First World War and to some extent outside of Europe after the Second World War with 
the colonial liberation.  
 
Finally, in March 2007, Ahtisaari submitted his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon. His proposal recommended that Kosovo 
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should be granted independence, with an interim period of supervision by the relevant international 
mechanisms. The UN Secretary-General gave his full endorsement to the Proposal before sending it 
to the UN Security Council for adoption. However, due to Serbia and Russia‘s opposition to 
Ahtisaari‘s recommendation the UN Security Council has not yet passed a resolution recognizing 
Kosovo‘s independence.Based on Ahtisaari‘s Proposal, Kosovo declared its independence on the 17th 
of February 2008. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo came into force on 15 June 2008. By 
now, Kosovo has been recognized as a sovereign state by over 100 states. In mid-2009, Kosovo also 
gained full membership in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
148
  
 
The issue of membership in other institutions, such as the Council of Europe, EU, OSCE or UN, is a 
political one, depending on the increase in the numbers of recognitions and the political good will to 
accept the new reality. However, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice 
pronounced on 22 July 2010 was clear the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 
February 2008 did not violate international law.
149
  
 
Within Kosovo, the consolidation of state structures and the application of the rule of law is also an 
ongoing process, fraught with many challenges. In addition to an economic situation that is in need of 
urgent resuscitation, the north of Kosovo with its Serb community continues to challenge Pristina‘s 
authority.
150
 
 
Kosovo's declaration of independence also meant that one of the most difficult issues in the 
contemporary international politics came back to the fore. The principles of the Ahtisaari Plan were 
incorporated into the constitution that entered into force in June 2008. Although the proclamation 
was expected, the recognition was difficult to manage because it divided the governments of the world 
into two camps: those who recognized or intend to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, and those 
who would not intend to do so.  
 
This reason behind this division was not only about Kosovo and Serbia, or Serb-Albanian relations, 
but about the way it affected international law and world order. The problem with sovereignty must 
therefore be considered on two levels: Serb-Albanian relations and regional developments in the 
Balkans and international law and the international world order. 
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A European state's boundaries haven‘t changed against its consent and with the support of military 
force since the World War II. It is a violation of international law, the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, 
and against a fundamental principle of the United Nations and in Serbia's case against the Resolution 
1244.  
 
This is why the question of Kosovo's independence is so controversial and the international 
community is so divided on the issue of recognizing Kosovo, and it tends to be treated as a precedent. 
Kosovo‘s example can send a signal to other minority groups seeking independence that international 
actors will side with the underdog in case the dispute evolves into a violent conflict. Also what the 
governments may take from this is that if they do not keep their minorities under control, any 
concessions in terms of self-government can lead to a full secession.
151
  
 
The reason why the issue is creating tension in international politics and in the current situation within 
Kosovo is that fewer states recognize independent Kosovo than the former UN administration, which 
means that resolution remains in force, unrevised, due to a lack of consensus among the five 
permanent UNSC member states.
152
 Currently this means that Kosovo cannot become a member of 
the UN, because the membership is decided by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the 
Security Council. In the Security Council it would be blocked by Russia and China. 
 
On the whole, the situation has remained stable, although the Mitrovica –question has created some 
instability in the region. In Kosovo the divided town of Mitrovica, where the Serbs live north and 
Albanians in the south, has become the epicenter of the conflict and it is not unlikely that this city, 
and the whole country as well, may be officially divided. The question is sensitive but it is difficult to 
see how the Serb minority could be integrated into the independent Kosovo. One solution might be 
that the Serbian population gradually moved to Serbia, although this might signal all Serbian 
communities that they are not welcome in Kosovo. 
 
Serbia itself reinforces the question of the identity crisis as something that the entire Serb nation is 
experiencing, as the Serbian population is spread in several other countries in the region. There are 
different views on whether Serbia should orient itself east towards Russia or west towards the EU with 
the debate creating a division between two traditional orientations within the country.
153
 The issue 
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might potentially lead to a trauma within the Serbian nation and in the future could produce thoughts 
of revanchism among the Serbs. 
  
The EU is also divided on the issue. Even though the EU is trying to avoid open disputes, it is clear 
that the issue of Kosovo's independence has to be interpreted as a defeat for the Union. It has also 
become clear that the EU has no instruments or policies for managing ethnic conflicts. The message 
that the EU has sent is that state failure is a reasonable way to resolve an ethnic conflict. 
Simultaneously, the EU has pleaded for multiculturalism in Europe but shied away from the 
problems that ethnic diversity can bring about. The promise of the EU integration has not been quite 
credible or attractive enough to provide an alternative to state failure.
154
 
 
Kosovo's independence strengthens the Albanian majority population‘s identity, as they have sought 
this since the early 1990's. Meanwhile, there are still extensive developmental, economic, social and 
political problems. For the Serbs, on the other hand, an independent Kosovo is unthinkable. It allows 
the divided Mitrovica continue to be important, because it provides a setting for a potential new 
conflict. 
 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission – EULEX  
 
The EU also had plans to take over the operations in Kosovo since it already administered Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Mission was established under the 
Ahtisaari Plan. The ESDP Mission was to mentor, monitor and advise Kosovo authorities in the area 
of rule of law generally, and had the executive and judicial functions in the judiciary, police, border 
control, customs and correctional services including the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of 
cases of war crimes, terrorism, organized crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic 
crimes and other serious crimes.
155
 
 
The European Union Law of Mission, EULEX, was created in February 2008, but it became fully 
operational only on the 9
th
 of December 2008. The EU Joint Action of February 2008 and the 
Council Decision of June 2010 and June 2012 provided the legal basis for the mission. The European 
Union Planning Team (EUPT) established prior to EULEX in 2006, and ―provided technical advice 
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for the EU in order to support and maintain dialogue with UNMIK in regard to its plans for 
downsizing and transfer of competences to local institutions.‖156 
 
The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) were operating under the legal authority of 
Resolution 1244 at the time, and therefore the Kosovo authorities did not formally consent to the 
EUPT deployment. EUPT was active in discussions between UNMIK and the Kosovo authorities 
concerning the transfer of responsibilities and amendments to existing legislation and changes to 
administrative structures, but in the absence of the Security Council endorsement, it became evident 
that the Ahtisaari plan would not be able to bring about a consensual solution to the Kosovo status as 
the US would strongly supported a unilateral declaration of Kosovo while five EU member states 
opposed to it.
157
   
 
As there was no new resolution to authorize EULEX as the successor of UNMIK, the EU council 
adopted the Joint Action to establish EULEX, by selective reference to Resolution 1244, only two 
weeks before Kosovo Assembly‘s unilateral declaration of independence.158 The Art. 23 (1) of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Union allows a member state to abstain in a vote but ―—not be 
obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union.‖ Therefore a 
unanimous majority among EU members was not a necessary condition for EULEX‘s deployment, 
and as it was also to be staffed on voluntary basis, the adoption of the Joint Action establishing 
EULEX under Articles 14 and 25 of the Treaty Establishing the European Union was possible.
159
 
 
Although EULEX is a Rule of law mission, it undertakes many activities that could be characterized 
as SSR. This may be a reflection of the ―internal politics of the EU in which several member states do 
not recognize Kosovo and object to the label SSR on the basis that it would entail a de facto 
recognition of Kosovo‘s sovereignty.‖160  
 
The mandate of EULEX was slightly more robust than in the provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan on the 
ESDP Rule of Law Mission. EULEX‘s task was to: ―monitor, mentor and advise the competent Kosovo 
institutions on all areas related to the wider rule of law (including a customs service), whilst retaining certain 
executive responsibilities; ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and security 
including, as necessary, in consultation with the relevant international civilian authorities in Kosovo, through 
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reversing or annulling operational decisions taken by the competent Kosovo authorities--.‖161 This granted 
EULEX the more control over the local authorities, but also the responsibility of running the 
institutions. 
 
Because EULEX was placed under the authority of UNMIK and the Resolution 1244, the new legal 
order established by the Republic of Kosovo founded on its Constitution and the Ahtisaari Plan was 
disregarded. However, the EULEX officials had to operate within the legal system of the Republic of 
Kosovo and to interact with officials of the Republic of Kosovo even though the Resolution 1244 
didn‘t recognize them.162  
 
This de-facto cooperation allowed the Kosovo Serb leaders to argue that EULEX supported the 
interests of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo instead of committing to status neutrality and 
respect of Resolution 1244.
163
 It became impossible for EULEX to accomplish its mandate under 
such circumstances, i.e. pretending to operate formally under the status-neutral framework of 
Resolution 1244 while at the same time co-operating de-facto in justice and other legal matters with 
the authorities of the Republic of Kosovo.
164
  
 
Instead of supporting the rule of law, EULEX‘s ambivalent approach lead to legal confusion and to 
expectations which were difficult to meet. In a fragile environment like Kosovo, this has worked 
against EULEX on several occasions. Its decision to conclude an agreement with the Serbian Ministry 
of Interior on police cooperation already sparked serious political and legal confrontations between 
EULEX and the Government of Kosovo, the latter insisting that the conclusion of such agreements 
with neighbouring states was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of 
Kosovo.
165
  
 
A split union that doesn‘t have the resources on their own - without the US - to monitor the two 
protectorates, could potentially have contributed to increased violence in both countries. An increase 
in volatility could be initiated in Kosovo by radical Albanian groups, who regard the international 
administration as an occupation and only want the military support - not international governance. 
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Kosovo s security sector and institutions 1999-2015
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Figure 4. below illustrates this thesis‘ interpretation of the development and transformation of the 
major security institutions throughout the three phases. It emphasizes the ‗dual conversion‘ process 
that Kosovo‘s post-conflict security sector has experienced; the initially intended demilitarized KLA 
was first transformed into a civilian disaster relief organization, and later back into a re-armed military 
security force.
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Figure 4. Kosovo‘s Security Sector and Institutions 1999-2005 
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Pursuant to the Ahtisaari Plan, the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo (ICR) was 
appointed. The ICR also served as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR), reported to, 
and was under the auspices of the International Steering Group for Kosovo (ISG) - a group of states 
that recognized and supported the independence of Kosovo comprising 23 European Union 
countries, the United States, and Turkey.  
 
The ISG supported the International Civilian Office (ICO) that was set up in Pristina to guide 
Kosovo‘s democratic development, good governance, multi-ethnicity and the rule of law; and to 
supervise the Government of Kosovo's implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. After the successful 
implementation by the Government Kosovo of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement, on 10 September 2012, upon the recommendations by the ICO, the International 
Steering Group for Kosovo formally ended its supervision of Kosovo‘s independence, and the 
Government of Kosovo became responsible for its own governance.  
 
Despite some inter-ethnic frictions among the Kosovar Serbs and Albanians, the relations with Serbia 
have remained tense but mainly stable after the declaration of independence. Disagreements over 
Kosovo‘s status and Serbia‘s objections have often prevented Kosovo from joining regional 
cooperation initiatives. The ongoing challenge faced by the institutions of Kosovo is extending their 
authority in the northern part of the country, as the Kosovo Serbs‘ refuse to recognize the institutions 
that resulted from the Ahtisaari Plan. However, the recent agreements with Serbia on normalizing the 
relations and both countries‘ institutionalized paths towards EU integration have paved the way to 
easing the remaining disputes between the two countries and increased regional cooperation and 
participation in collective security mechanisms.
167
   
 
Kosovo‘s security sector is challenged by increased volatility in the socio-economic domain and 
asymmetric, non-conventional security risks and threats such as degradation of the living environment, 
technological developments and a complex political environment in the post-independence period.
168
 
 
Among the most obvious forms of external threat to the national security of Kosovo are international 
organized crime and illegal migration. Security sector related reports also mention international 
terrorism and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction as potential risks. 
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Domestic challenges include unpredictable sources of threats emanating from the impact of economic 
crisis and low levels of socio-economic development, environmental challenges and threats stemming 
from globalization technological developments and the political developments in Western Balkans. 
Many of threats, risks and challenges that Kosovo faces are regional and transnational in nature, which 
suggests that international cooperation and participation in collective regional and international 
mechanisms is increasingly important.
169
 
 
5.1 Security Sector Review in Kosovo 
 
In March 2012 a Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR), a review of the state‘s security institutions, 
was initiated by the Government of the Republic of Kosovo. The objective was to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of all the aspects of security in order to analyze current and future security 
challenges, define roles of existing institution in the security sector to avoid duplication and maximize 
institutional capabilities; and to identify capabilities required to provide for the safety and security of 
Kosovo‘s citizens. The SSR‘s main goal was to produce strategic level policy guidance and concrete 
recommendations for Kosovo‘s security sector.170 
 
In his study on six developing and transition countries, David Law finds that due to political 
underdevelopment prior to the conflict, individual security sector jurisdictions were already 
competing for the resources. In Kosovo this was reflected in the pre-war power struggle between the 
more extremist LPK/KLA –coalition and the more moderate LDK. 
 
Several obstacles stand in the way of transferring responsibility to a local authority; In Kosovo, ―the 
tense relationship between Serb and Albanian Kosovars, and the lack of clarity about the province‘s 
future status has meant that the security sector remains mainly in the hands of UNMIK and 
KFOR.‖171 The close involvement of the KLA in the conflict may undermine the accountability of 
Kosovo‘s security institutions, as many combatants suspected of war crimes have not been prosecuted. 
In this regard an SSR may even consolidate the power of these actors. 
 
The international actors, however, often tend to support the former rebel groups‘ participation in 
politics, potentially because this may lead to the elimination of the factions that refuse to cooperate 
with them. Many secessionist movements‘ end goal is to establish an independent nation, and KLA 
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was willing to cooperate with the international actors in order to further this process. KLA agreed to 
i.e. power-sharing agreements, a DDR, amnesties and reduced sentences for crimes committed 
during the conflict.
172
 
 
The security sector review in Kosovo outlined the national security interests and objectives of the 
republic of Kosovo as independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; constitutional order; 
sustainable economic development; life, welfare, property and safety of the citizens of Kosovo; and 
regional stability and membership in international organizations. They were categorized in the SSR in 
as the following: 
 
1. Independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity 1.1. Conservation and protection of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity 1.2. The use of diplomatic means in the interest of protecting the sovereignty 
and integrity of the Republic of Kosovo 1.3. Capacity development of Security and Defense 1.4. 
Integrated management and control of the state borders 2. Constitutional order 2.1. Maintaining and 
strengthening the rule of law and order throughout the country 2.2. Respect for the human rights and 
freedoms according to the international standards and norms 2.3. Ensuring a unified and 
independent judicial system 3. Sustainable economic development 3.1. Policy development for a free 
market and stable economy 3.2. A favorable environment for foreign and domestic investment 3.3. 
Regional and international economic cooperation 4. Life, welfare, property and safety of the citizens 
of Kosovo 4.1. Protection of life and property 4.2. Increase social welfare for all citizens 4.3. Ensuring 
the overall safety of the citizens 5.1. Integration and cooperation with the European Union and Euro-
Atlantic structures 5.2. Membership in international organizations 5.3. Active participation in 
Regional and International mechanisms 5.4. Promotion of Kosovo abroad.
173
 
 
The following sections will concentrate on these subjects under more general headings.  
 
Political environment 
 
Despite the consolidation of the security situation, Kosovo and the Balkan region will need initiatives 
that contain and prevent political tensions in the future. Serbia, along with a large number of states 
and other international actors, continues to challenge the legitimacy of Kosovo‘s declaration of 
independence. Although Belgrade has not interfered directly in the capacity building of Kosovo 
institutions, it continues to obstruct the strengthening and expansion of security sector in particular. 
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Serbia continues to finance and operate parallel administrative and security institutions in Serb-
dominated areas in Kosovo.
174
 
 
The international community has often acted as a mediator between the Serbian and Albanian 
population in order to prevent the tensions from out bursting into open hostilities. Although the 
Serbian residents in northern Kosovo have regularly opposed to the Kosovo Government‘s attempts 
to seal the northern border-crossing, political disputes have calmed recently with the mediation of 
international community. 
 
The agreement on the normalization of relations that was signed in April 2013 under the auspices of 
the European Union stipulates the dismantling of Serbian structures in the north. In return, the Serb-
inhabited municipalities will be given a greater degree of autonomy. The relations with Serbia remain 
tense but do not constitute a direct threat. 
 
The integration of Western Balkans and Kosovo in the European political, economic and security 
institutions is essential in order to foster regional cooperation and lessen the potential for political 
instability. The European Union membership may be able to neutralize some the sources of political 
tensions between Serbia and Kosovo – however, it is not a likely event in the near future due to the 
objections from some member states that have not recognized Kosovo‘s independence. 
 
Serbia‘s own EU-membership bid is also an important strategic factor in Kosovo‘s integration efforts. 
Strengthened EU –relations may contribute to the relaxation of Serbia‘s obstructions to Kosovo‘s 
incorporation in other regional political, economic and security mechanisms. As one demonstration 
of this, Serbia dropped its opposition to an international dialing code for Kosovo in September 
2013.
175
 The dialing code dispute has been a complicated and costly problem since the end of the war, 
and Serbia‘s concession marks an important milestone. 
 
Apart from EU, NATO also plays an important part in securing political stability in the region. 
NATO has had an active role in Kosovo through KFOR in the post-conflict period, and Kosovo has 
benefited from the security contribution of the individual NATO members as well. As of yet, Kosovo 
has not entered into a formal cooperation with NATO, although KSF was awarded the declaration of 
full operational capability on 9 July 2013
176
 which signals trust in Kosovo‘s local institutions. The 
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NATO member states have not been able to find common ground on how the declaration of 
independence will affect the future cooperation.
177
 
 
Socio-economic environment 
 
Collier and Hoeffler have discovered that economic incentives are an important factor in civil wars. 
The availability of ‗lootable‘ resources (diamonds and other precious stones, minerals, oil, timber, 
opium, etc.) and high unemployment, especially among youth, can make it cheap to raise an army, as 
simply promising them that they can keep what they can loot may be enough incentive for them to 
join military factions.‖178  
 
A World Bank study points out that in many of the poorest countries in the world poverty is both the 
cause and the effect of conflict.  The majority of the world‘s 20 poorest countries have suffered a 
major war in the past 15 years.
179
 Kosovo is one the poorest countries in Europe, and has one of the 
highest unemployment rates as well.
180
 Economic security is considered as their biggest concern by 
many Kosovars. Even with rapid progress after the conflict, it can take decades to return to pre-war 
living conditions. 
 
Furthermore, a UNDP human development report shows that countries at war tend to invest less in 
socio-economic needs and those with increased military expenditure often make large cuts on 
education and healthcare.
181
  
 
Poor health conditions and infrastructure may also further exacerbate the risk of war. Nation‘s 
childhood mortality exceeding 100 per 1000, suggests an increase in the probability of it becoming 
engaged in an armed conflict.
182
 Therefore investment in a universal healthcare with a unified 
accessible health system reduces the risk of conflict from a socio-economic point of view, as it signals 
justice and stability.
183
 
 
Apart from the other impacts of war, Kosovo‘s socio-economic environment also initially suffered 
from the lack of foreign investment as it was difficult to attract foreign investment due to missing 
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institutions and legislation, thus preventing economic recovery. Peace-building missions often 
overlook the need for economic assistance. Development aid donors tend to fund NGOs or public 
offices, which rarely create gainful employment opportunities, leaving small and mid-sized businesses 
that drive the economy, without assistance.
184
 The government had to prioritize the development of 
new state institutions at the expense of others, which has led to underdevelopment in certain areas.
185
  
 
A cornerstone of the UNMIK -led economic reconstruction policy was privatization that was to create 
jobs and attract foreign investors. A special agency for privatization (KTA) administered all public 
owned businesses and reorganized and privatized them. A series of activities were privatized quickly, 
which led to legal problems. The Serbs (both the minority in Kosovo and the government in 
Belgrade) saw this as theft because some businesses were publicly owned and technically belonged to 
Serbia.  
 
UNMIK first ignored all protests but finally the matter was taken to the international court and the 
privatization process halted. It resumed eventually after some modifications but has continued to be 
controversial. There have also been different views on the process within the EU and between the EU 
and the USA. 
 
Although Kosovo‘s economy has been growing steadily in recent years, social pressure has become a 
major issue. Kosovo faces serious unemployment and poverty problems as poverty and youth 
unemployment rates are among the highest in Europe. The economic recovery has been slow, and 
the private sector has not been able accommodate the demands for jobs while the economy and 
welfare still rely heavily on remittances and international aid. 
 
The Strategic Security Sector Review provided a macroeconomic overview for 2014-2018, and the 
forecast is the following: ―The economic structure (GDP components as % of overall GDP) is 
assumed to remain widely constant. Growth is expected to be driven by increased consumption, a 
higher relative contributor in real terms (after calculating the effects of inflation). It is anticipated that 
approximately 2 % of the average growth of GDP (4.8 %) in the period 2014-2018 will result from the 
real increase in exports and investments.‖186  
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Kosovo‘s membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
cooperation with other financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank is expected to accelerate the reform process. The re-activation of privatized enterprises and the 
on-going increase in registration of agro-businesses may also contribute to an increase in private 
investments. 
 
The recent economic crisis in Europe has affected all Western Balkans countries as growth rates 
nearly stalled, and the negative consequences of the crisis have also affected people incomes and 
welfare.
 187
 Decreased government spending on social security and the welfare state has caused life 
satisfaction levels to drop significantly as well as people‘s trust in institutions.188 These consequences 
attest to the region‘s interconnectedness and the spillover effect of external risks which could 
challenge the stability. Kosovo Security Barometer survey found that Kosovars perceive the economic 
situation as the paramount challenge face Kosovo and its security.
189
 
 
Kosovo's economy can be said to consist primarily of assistance, remittances, a weak domestic 
economy that is dependent on the resource as well as the market made up of the extensive 
international presence and a widespread black market including criminal networks and syndicates. 
The Serb minority in Mitrovica have in turn received and depended on support from Serbia, through 
which their parallel structures have been developed.
190
 The political and security processes are directly 
affected and shaped by socio-economic environment, consequently making it an essential element of 
security. 
 
The 2014 Kosovo Security Barometer shows that unemployment and economy are perceived as the 
main threat by almost 25% of the respondents, compared to Serbia (13%) and corruption (12%) 
(figure 5.). This indicates that economic recovery is necessary in order to build and maintain the sense 
of social order and public security. 
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Figure 5. Main Threats According to Kosovo Citizens
191
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kosovo‘s membership in the Central Europe Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the prospect of 
further economic integration with Europe, is likely to have positive effects on its socio-economic 
development. Increased regional political and economic cooperation that potentially minimizes 
perceived regional political risks can also encourage foreign direct investment and capital exchange. 
However, the integration of Kosovo‘s economy in the global economy can also lead to increased 
volatility in the global markets. Kosovo needs to formulate a social security to provide a safety net and 
insurance to be able to react to economic re-adjustments in the future.
192
 
 
Kosovo‘s biggest challenges regarding security may be of political and socio-economic nature, but 
natural disasters such as flooding, avalanches, landslides and earthquakes are also a security 
environment concern that the SSSR addresses. Man-man hazards, including the pollution and the 
industrial and chemical waste that Trepca Complex and Obilic Power Plants produce also continue to 
be pose risks to the population and the environment. Due to the unpreparedness of the institutions 
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responsible of disaster management, natural disasters as well as industrial accidents or human 
negligence risks can threaten the security of Kosovo‘s population.193  
 
Extremism  
 
Over 95% of Kosovo‘s population identifies as Muslim194, and like many other Islam countries expects 
an increase in the extremist movements from outside Kosovo. The SSSR does not limit the potential 
threat from these movements to radical Islamic ones, as they may have origins in many different 
cultures, ideologies and intentions. In order to improve its internal security environment, cooperating 
with neighboring countries to counter any form or extremism, be that political, religious or ethnic is 
essential for Kosovo.
195
  
 
In August 2014, Kosovo police arrested 40 ethnic Albanians suspected of fighting alongside Islamic 
extremists in Iraq and Syria.
196
 This sparked much speculation especially among the international 
actors about the potential rise of radicalisation of Islam and terrorism in Kosovo. By arresting these 
suspects, Hashim Thaci may have just wanted to show the US in particular that Kosovo is doing their 
part in preventing further involvement with the Middle Eastern countries, but in reality the 
recruitment of potential Islam fighters is relatively marginal in Kosovo.  
 
Despite this, the Kosovars regard Participation of Kosovo citizens in Syria and Iraq conflicts as a high-
level risk according to the 2014 Kosovo Security Barometer (Figure 6.). However, addressing these 
concerns is necessary in order to create the feeling of more secure environment and foster trust in the 
local administration and government. Almost 60% of the population perceive the government very 
corrupted (Figure 7.), and making it more accountable to the general public may create trust through 
transparency. 
 
Over 50% believe that Serbia poses a high level of external risk, which may play in favour of military 
investments and result in unnecessary securitization of issues that are not military in nature. 
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Figure 6. Greatest External threats towards national security of Kosovo
197
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proliferation of small arms and Unexploded Ordnance/Improvised Explosive Device UXO/IED  
 
As a result of the incomplete turning in of weapons during the DDR –process, different sources and 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs have confirmed that there is still a large number of estimated that units 
of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Kosovo, many of which are in the illegal possession of 
individual citizens and other groups. Preventing the proliferation of small arms strengthens the 
stability of the internal security environment, and Kosovo needs to develop and improve its capacities 
in arms control.
198
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Landmines and different bombs - unexploded ordnances (UXOs) - were left behind in the latest war, 
and Kosovo has been affected by them also in the post-war period. According to ITF Enhancing 
Human Security, the mine and cluster problem in Kosovo territory is a result of the 1999 
circumstances and consequent NATO bombing campaign. There are still multiple confirmed 
dangerous sites in Kosovo which will need to be demined. The demining operation was first 
conducted by The United Nations Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and later became a part of 
KSF‘s responsibilities. To guarantee a safe environment for the civilians, all UXO‘s need to be 
cleared from the Kosovo territory.
199
  
 
Organized crime  
 
Organized crime has long been a significant problem in Kosovo. It is not limited only to the territory 
of Kosovo but rather it is a transnational problem. It threatens and impairs the rule of law and the 
economic development perspective in Kosovo. As the drug traffic through neighboring countries has 
decreased as a consequence of their EU membership, Kosovo has become the primary transit 
country for Afghan drugs destined for Europe.
200
  
 
The majority of respondents to the 2014 Kosovo Security Barometer perceived organized crime as a 
high level of threat to state security. Kosovo‘s state institutions have had limited success in fighting 
organized crime, and due to the close cooperation of KLA and organized crime groups prior and 
during the war, some members of the current political regime may still have connections to organized 
crime networks.
201
 
 
Corruption  
 
An EU report published in March 2015 describes corruption as an omnipresent phenomenon in the 
region and Kosovo‘s judiciary incapable of meeting the challenges of organised crime. The report also 
sharply criticizes EULEX, stating that ―[EULEX‘s] credibility has been damaged to the point that its 
actions will henceforth often be tainted with suspicion and every decision to convict or not to convict 
will risk being criticized on the basis of corruption.‖202 
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Corruption critically undermines confidence in public institutions, and negatively impacts economic 
development and Euro-Atlantic integration, and Kosovars rank corruption the second most important 
problem facing them today after unemployment. According to an UNDOC report, an average of 12 
per cent of voters at the penultimate general election in 2007 and another 10 per cent at the local 
election in 2009 were asked to vote for a certain candidate or political party in exchange for a 
concrete offer of money, goods or a favor, which reflects the level of corruption in particular in the 
public sector.
203
  
 
The 2014 Security Barometer found that 73% of the respondents find the Government corrupt, with 
respect to municipalities the figure being 55%. As for the Kosovo Police, citizens‘ perception towards 
the Police is highly divided. Around 33.5 % of the respondents stated that the KP is not corrupt, while 
another 34 percent claimed that the KP is corrupt.  The perception of the Kosovo citizens towards 
the KSF was highly positive. Around 69 percent of the respondents stated that the KSF is not a 
corrupt institution.
204
 
 
Figure 7. Citizens‘ perception on corruption205 
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Cyber crime  
 
Kosovo also has to commit to advancing the development of the information technology domain that 
was almost non-existent until the mid 90‘s. Individuals and states are increasing dependent on 
communication and information systems, which makes them vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can 
cause significant damage to national systems, networks or infrastructures of information, economy, 
banks, business, and air and land traffic. Cybercrime is acknowledged to be stimulated and induced 
by a political agenda or criminal activities, and consequently requires an action plan from the state.
206
 
 
In August 2015 the Kosovo police arrested three people suspected of committing cyber-crimes, with 
the suspects being accused of "theft of personal and banking data and online sale of malicious 
software to infect computers."
207
 The OSCE Mission has trained Kosovo Police on cybercrime since 
2009 and following its recommendations, the Kosovo Police established its cybercrime unit in 2011. 
 
Multinational integration and cooperation 
 
Both the government and political elites are strong supporters of EU integration as a national strategic 
goal. The vast majority of the population is supportive of the integration process.
208
 Kosovo has been 
offered the Visa Liberalisation Process by the European Commission in 2012 and it presents an 
important mechanism for dialogue on important security concerns. It also serves as an important 
catalyst for the Europeanization of the security practices.  
 
However, the Government is still waiting for the green light from the Commission on the Mechanism 
for Stabilisation and Association – a process that should streamline the dialogue with the EU and 
make it more official. Kosovo‘s European integration perspective is an important development for 
regional cooperation and stability in Western Balkans. Overall, regional integration activities and the 
interest in membership in NATO and the EU have probably been one of the most important factors 
pushing change in the security sectors.
209
 
 
NATO has actively participated in the establishment of the Kosovo security institutions in the post-
conflict period, but despite the high level of NATO‘s direct involvement in Kosovo for more than a 
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decade and despite the fact that all Kosovo‘s neighboring countries have already signed Partnership 
for Peace (PFP) programs with NATO, Kosovo is the only country outside of the accession talks
210
 
This is in part due to the incomplete capacity building, but the SSSR may constitute a step towards the   
accession negotiations.
211
  
 
However, although the non-recognizing NATO members have been participating in the assistance 
and training of the Kosovo Security Force, Kosovo‘s membership would be challenged by internal 
opposition within the Alliance. As with most integration efforts, the majority of Kosovars consider 
NATO membership beneficial for Kosovo and are of the opinion that it along with EU integration 
solves their security dilemmas.
212
  
 
Kosovo‘s United Nations membership is also an unlikely event as two UN Security Council members 
oppose its independence and membership. UN membership would probably be the most security 
policy milestone for Kosovo as it would finalize the declaration of independence. Considering the 
difficulties in acquiring memberships in multilateral organizations, Kosovo‘s best bet is probably to 
seek active participation in regional Western Balkans and South-East Europe political and security 
initiatives.
213
 
 
Participation in international operations 
 
Since its inception, KSF has actively expressed willingness to participate in international peacekeeping 
missions. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo states that the ―Kosovo Security Force shall 
serve as a national security force for the Republic of Kosovo and may send its members abroad in full 
conformity with its international responsibilities.‖214 The Law on Overseas Deployment of the Kosovo 
Security Force regulates the deployment, allowing the KSF to participate in peace support operations, 
humanitarian operations, training and exercises.
215
  
 
KSF‘s operational challenges and political complexities have hindered its participation in international 
missions. The issue of recognition prevents KSF from joining most missions as an individual 
contingent, but they may be able to avoid full resistance from non-recognizing countries by joining 
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bigger contingents. Bilateral agreements with host countries, rather than multilateral agreements, are 
more likely to yield participation in international operations and trainings considering the existing 
political challenges.
216
 
 
Defense capabilities 
 
The respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a sovereign state is a principle that is 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments.
217
 Therefore it 
also implies the right to defend the country in case of military attacks or any other external threats to 
the wellbeing of the state or its citizens.  
 
In terms of recent mainly positive developments in the security climate in the Western Balkans, it 
may be difficult for Kosovo to justify the need for investments specifically targeted towards 
strengthening the capacity to respond to external military threats. However, a strong defense sector 
holds a symbolic value.  
 
KFOR, whose mandate is derived from the UNSC Resolution 1244 as well as the Military-Technical 
Agreement, has been the only authority to exercise the right of territorial defense since the post-
conflict period. The declaration of independence saw significant changes in the structure and 
performance of KFOR on the ground and the missions started to withdraw troops as the security 
situation improved. Kosovo police took over border control and customs responsibilities and KFOR 
presence was reduced mainly to the northern part of Kosovo.
218
 
 
Kosovar security institutions, KSF in particular, have not exercised any component falling within the 
scope of defending territorial integrity, as the existing legislation does not provide an explicit mandate 
for the KSF to perform such tasks. However, there are no legal provisions prohibiting it either. 
 
The Article 125 of the Constitutional provisions states that "the Republic of Kosovo has authority over 
law enforcement, security, justice, public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response and boarder 
control within its territory"
219
, which can be interpreted as the right to territorial defense. The 
provisions also recognize the authority of the President of Kosovo in declaring the state of emergency.  
                                                 
216
 Muja, A. 2013, p. 14 
217
 Ker-Lindsay, J. 2013, p. 5 
218
 Muja, A. 2013, pp. 14-15 
219
 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 125.1 
64 
 
 
 
The Law on KSF expressly provides that its tasks lie in disaster relief and civil protection, as 
increasing capacity in those segments was in the interest of the international actors. KSF is mandated 
to assist civil authorities in responding to natural and man-made hazards and emergencies, including 
participation as part of regional or international crisis response to conduct explosive ordinance 
disposal and to assist civil authorities through civil protection operations.
220
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6 Conclusion 
 
All phases of security sector developments in Kosovo are largely characterized by a top-down 
approach, although SSR processes often call for a more holistic implementation. In Kosovo, however, 
the international actors have dictated policies while the local actors have had little say in the process. 
Furthermore, the nature and scope of the threats that Kosovo faced have not been given adequate 
consideration. The structure and institutional set-up of the security sector should be carefully 
implemented, taking into account the demands by the local communities as well as regional and 
international political concerns.
221
 Top-down reform may change the formal structure, but has less 
impact on underlying incentives, power politics and culture.  
 
What hindered UNMIK from the start was that its directive shifted with every UN representative who 
led the mission. Attempts to find a balance between Serbs and Albanians - and various factions within 
those groups - and international actors resulted in incoherent policies and the absence of actual targets 
or clear direction.  
 
A difficult initial phase was followed by overly optimistic estimations about the stability of the situation 
in Kosovo. This in turn almost led to the collapse of UNMIK when a new wave of ethnic violence 
against Serbs occurred in March 2004. It became an endpoint of the previously conducted policies 
and a comprehensive revision of objectives occurred during and after 2005. The crisis in 2004 
highlighted the widespread problems that the international actors were facing when in Kosovo and 
that the tension, caused by a dispute over authority, between the PISG and UNMIK had only 
increased.
222
  
 
Until 2003 extensive rehabilitation and reconstruction effort in Kosovo led to visible results in the 
form of repaired roads, houses and other buildings, as well as revived agriculture.
223
 The presence of 
the international staff meant an economic upswing as there was now demand for interpreters and 
other local staff, and also created a market for example cafes, hotels and taxis. Activities previously 
done informally on a small scale also came to the surface and became legalized. 
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During the first years of the post-war period, extensive humanitarian assistance was provided to help 
the returning refugees, and focused on establishing peace and order and securing residents.
224
 This aid 
was gradually withdrawn although there was a clear need for systematic a longer-term development 
assistance. However, in the absence of the state and a legal framework comprehensive assistance 
programs were not implemented.  
 
Instead, there were a number of individual projects in various sectors without any real long-term goals 
and the problem of Kosovo's status, even when it came to development assistance, became 
increasingly apparent. A significant problem was also that there were no population statistics about 
Kosovo, which meant that a census needed to be done in order to evaluate the amount of potential 
beneficiaries. The different ministries in the PISG engaged in politics on the basis of their various 
estimates of the population of Kosovo, which ranged from 1.7 to 2.4 million inhabitants.
225
 
 
A significant portion of the initial assistance phased out by 2003, and led to an economic slowdown. 
The decline was gradual, but its effect became visible in 2003. The UN administration and much of 
the international community mistook the first years of economic boom as a general trend, which was 
not the case. The fundamental problems including ethnic relations, the status issue and the 
fragmented region's economic opportunities also were severely underestimated. 
 
Albanians in turn were overly optimistic about the economic prospects of an independent Kosovo 
and generally had a naive view of the region's importance in the international economy. Kosovars also 
see their young unemployed population as a labour asset for Europe, but there is already plenty of 
work-related migration within the EU, and no guarantee that international investors would want to 
invest in Kosovo in particular.  
 
Kosovo‘s status issue has blocked the possibility of major developments in the security sector and has 
also made development assistance difficult. This means that Kosovo from an aid perspective has been 
a rather unusual experience. The problem can be summarized as follows: without a defined status, it 
is impossible to draft a development aid strategy. There is no state or institutions for the international 
aid agencies to provide loans and credit-overdrafts for, and therefore no security for foreign investors. 
Without development aid strategy there are no programs that the donors could provide long-term 
finance for.  
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A key lesson from Kosovo is that it has become apparent that the international system is not 
equipped to deal with ethnic conflicts and, on a general level, ethnic relations and multiculturalism. 
The situation in Kosovo was regarded for a long time by the international community as a human 
rights issue; however, it was not possible to reduce the question to it because it mostly deals with two 
ethnic groups‘ claims on the same territory. 
 
Kosovo represents a great example of a multi-ethnic nation where the representation of minorities 
and vulnerable groups is a necessary condition for sustainable peace.  However, the representation on 
its own does not guarantee a truly multi-ethnic security and justice system that provides effective 
security and justice services to all citizens, regardless of their ethnic background and status.
226
  
 
Political commitment from the international community is necessary in order to guarantee the 
continuity and cumulative progress of the missions. Trust between the civil society and the security 
sector grows from the legitimacy, discipline and accountability of the institutions and actors. The 
Security Sector Review process can consolidate the efforts through emphasizing the importance of 
service delivery to all citizens and facilitating trust building.  
 
Institutions where multi-ethnic representation was successful, such as the Kosovo Police, were 
generally perceived as more legitimate than those where multi-ethnic representation failed, such as the 
KPC. Whether multi-ethnicity is a significant factor as a rule in determining the legitimacy of security 
and justice institutions, is still debatable. In Kosovo, however, it is of particular importance 
considering the ethnic backdrop of the conflict. 
 
Where the international community has failed in establishing a functional security sector in Kosovo, 
the Security Sector Review has the potential to develop mechanisms and institutions to meet the 
society‘s justice and security needs and work on achieving durable solutions that are intrinsically 
linked. It can also ensure better coordination between humanitarian and SSR actors, in particular 
those working on the police and military, in order to better streamline the local and international 
efforts.  
 
The Kosovo Security Sector Review provides a framework for a national security policy and suggests a 
structure that designed to meet the requirements of democratic security sector institution building in 
Kosovo.  
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Figure 8. Suggested security sector architecture
227
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the observations made suggest that the international community has failed in providing 
sufficient support for the local community to develop transferable skills in security management. On 
one hand the international community has managed to stabilize the situation quickly by taking over all 
institutions, but on the other, this has crippled the Kosovars as they are not prepared to run them on 
their own. The recent Security Sector Review paves out a way for a presentable transformation, but it 
is clear that the Kosovars are no longer willing to let the international community dictate how the 
security sector is structured, managed and resourced. 
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